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1
Introduction

During my third year of college, I spent a semester in Paris where though I’d anticipated
focusing on studying French, I found myself taking mostly courses in my other major, Religious
Studies. In addition to my “Laïcité en France” class through my program, I enrolled in two
Religious Studies courses at l’Institut Catholique de Paris. While the other students in my
program enrolled in courses at La Sorbonne Nouvelle, a traditional French University, Religious
Studies as a discipline simply does not exist in France, leaving me with no choice but to enroll at
a private institute. The fact that I had to enroll in a private institution, paired with my course that
traced the history of laïcité, France’s particular version of secularism, made me very aware of
French cultural attitudes towards the role of religion in the public sphere. Following my semester
abroad I moved to Washington, D.C. for a summer internship at the Religious Freedom Center,
an institute housed inside the Newseum—a museum with a giant plaque quoting the First
Amendment and its promise of religious liberty. The juxtaposition of these two very different
cultural reactions to the public presence of religion pushed me to think more about what it means
to be secular and how state policies and cultural attitudes regarding religion favor certain groups.
This project arose from having dipped my toes in the intersection of secularism and laïcité.
While secularism has been a foundational American value since the emergence of the nation, the
history of Church/State relations in France looks quite different, where the principle of laïcité
developed at a turning point in the nation’s history during the French Revolution. This period
marked a break from the ancien régime, or French feudal society, where the Catholic Church
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dominated the social and political spheres, and the emergence of the French Republic—the
laïque (secular) government that exists today.
The difference between “secularism” and “laïcité” can be summed up by the dictionary
definitions of these words. The American Heritage Dictionary defines secularism as: “Religious
skepticism or indifference. The view that religious considerations should be excluded from civil
affairs or public education [emphasis mine].”1 The French Larousse Dictionary definition of
laïcité reads as follows: “Conception and organization of society founded on the separation of
Church and State and which excludes Churches from all exercise of political or administrative
power, and, in particular, the organization of education. (The principle of the laïcité of the State
is posed by the 1st article of the French Constitution of 1958.) [emphasis mine].”2 Even in these
basic definitions it is clear that secularism can be understood as an abstract concept referring to
the separation of Church and State powers, whereas the definition of laïcité is linked to the
specific social and political developments that occurred throughout the course of French history.
A 2004 National Assembly report on La Laïcité à l’école (Laïcité and Schools) points to laïcité’s
etymology, where “laïcité designates the laos, the people considered as an indivisible whole,”
showing how the French conception of laïcité differs from secularism by laïcité’s emphasis on
the unity of the social body under the state. 3 Due to the particular significance of laïcité in
shaping modern France, I leave the term untranslated throughout my thesis so as not to lose any
of its meaning. In Article 1 of the French Constitution of 1958, the constitution of the Fifth and

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2020.
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=secularism.
2 Larousse Dictionary.
https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/la%c3%afcit%c3%a9/45938?q=la%c3%afcit%c3%a9#45871.
Original text: “Conception et organisation de la société fondée sur la séparation de l'Église et de l'État et qui exclut
les Églises de l'exercice de tout pouvoir politique ou administratif, et, en particulier, de l'organisation de
l'enseignement. (Le principe de la laïcité de l'État est posé par l'article 1er de la Constitution française de 1958.).”
3 La Laïcité à l’école (2004) cited in Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2007), 90-91.
1
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current French Republic, it states: “France is an indivisible, laïque, democratic, and social
Republic,” listing laïque before democratic and thus underscoring the central importance of
laïcité in modern French political and social thought. 4 Being laïc is—to some—a crucial piece of
being French, and in my thesis I explore the ways in which laïcité has been politicized and how
it has developed into a key topic of debate in modern France.
For this project I decided to focus on investigating French laïcité during the late 1990s
and early 2000s, the era of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. The late twentieth century and
early twenty-first century proves a worthy period to focus on, as it marks the first major
reintroduction of laïcité in public discourse due to the increasing socioeconomic diversification
that characterized France at this time. The decolonial period witnessed large immigrant
movements from former colonies to mainland France in order to increase France’s labor force as
the country underwent economic growth and expansion for about thirty years following WWII,
commonly referred to as “les trente glorieuses” (“the thirty glorious [years]”). As a direct result,
France found itself with an unparalleled and ever-growing population of Muslims. This
diversification incited fiery discussions on the role of this new religion in French society in light
of the deeply rooted principle of laïcité—at once a foundational principle in French politics and
culture, yet lacking a clear and robust definition and remaining subject to interpretation. Was
Islam irreconcilable with French culture? Was the female Islamic headscarf, or the voile as it
came to be called, acceptable in France’s laïque society?
The right-wing administrations of Chirac and Sarkozy faced these questions head-on. In
this thesis, I argue that these two administrations contributed to the shaping of a new, more

French Const. of 1958, preamble, art. I. Original text: “La France est une République indivisible, laïque,
démocratique et sociale.”
4
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extreme version of laïcité that worked to exclude Muslims from the public sphere under the
guise of promoting neutrality, national unity, and heralding laïcité as a French exception. Laïcité
came to function largely as an identity marker, where “laïc” was an ambiguous characteristic of
the French citizen that is misunderstood by all others, thereby excluding those who do not fit the
definition.
My research is grounded in a collection of political documents as primary sources,
including transcripts of speeches given by Chirac and Sarkozy, commission reports such as the
Stasi Report (of the National Assembly’s Stasi Commission) and La laïcité à l’école (released by
the French National Assembly when the 2004 law prohibiting “ostensible” signs of religion was
passed), as well as a publication by Sarkozy himself, his 2004 book La république, les religions,
l’espérance (The Republic, Religions, and Hope). The Stasi Report and La laïcité à l’école are
both reports that uphold the government’s assertive approach to religion in which the State took
active measures to prohibit displays of religious belief or identity from the public sphere.
Sarkozy’s book, on the other hand, outlines his plan for a self-proclaimed progressive approach
to French laïcité whereby he simultaneously acknowledged the importance of religion (read:
Catholicism) in forming French social values historically, but addresses the growth of Islam as a
problem to solve by increasing engagement with Muslim communities in order to create a
“French Islam” rather than “Islam in France,” in which one sees Sarkozy’s desire to control and
shape manifestations of Islam in France. In Chapter 2’s discussion of feminism and the veil, I
also examine the 1989 petition against the veil “Profs, ne capitulons pas!” and a Fadela Amara
interview on her organization Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissive).
While my primary sources are largely political books, speeches, and other documents, for
theoretical framing I will turn to prominent French scholar Jean Baubérot. A historian and
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sociologist of laïcité in France, Baubérot has a track record of criticizing the way in which laïcité
has been employed to discriminatory ends. As a member of Chirac’s Stasi Commission, for
example, Baubérot was the only commission member to actively advocate for an interpretation
of laïcité that allowed space for public displays of religiosity. In keeping with this view,
Baubérot did not support the 2004 law banning “ostensible” religious signs, which he saw as
clearly targeted at female Muslims wearing the foulard, or headscarf. Baubérot’s sociological
approach is important to my examination of identity construction based on membership in
religious and national communities.
My considerations of these primary texts will of course also take into account a number
of secondary sources that take up the subject of French laïcité and its implications in the context
of diversification and globalization. The work of Murat Akan and Ahmet Kuru outlines the
historical development of laïcité and focus on the modern examples set by Chirac and Sarkozy
whose engagement with Muslim groups was rooted in the notion that Islam posed a security
threat to the French State and was represented as challenging French nationalism and the
republic’s foundational values. The debate thus develops around individualism due to one’s
religious identity versus national unity and French identity, itself a quasi-religion for staunch
Republicans according to scholars like Pierre Brechon and Jean-Paul Willaime.5 Akan poses the
key argument that while modern developments within laïcité have often been framed as a
reassertion of the principle, they in fact mark a departure from France’s historical laïcité.6 Kuru’s
book differentiated between State policies toward religion in the U.S. and France, arguing that

Pierre Brechon (1995, 65) and Jean-Paul Willaime (2005) cited in Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies
Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 113-114,
118.
6 Murat Akan, “The Politics of Laïcité Positive and Diversity in Contemporary France” in The Politics of
Secularization: Religion, Diversity, and Institutional Change in France and Turkey (Chichester, West Sussex:
Columbia University Press, 2017).
5
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France’s “assertive secularism” developed out of the existence of an ancien régime, which has
four components: monarchy, hegemonic religion, an alliance between the two, and a successful
republican movement.7
Additional secondary texts include those that deal more specifically with the “problem”
of Islam in France, perhaps best evidenced by the controversy surrounding the voile, which I
focus on in Chapter 2. Two important works on this topic are Joan Wallach Scott’s The Politics
of the Veil and John R. Bowen’s Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and
Public Space. These books describe the racism, Islamophobia, and identity politics that are often
perceived as threats by the French cultural and political establishment and thus contribute to the
development of an antagonistic laïcité.
My thesis retraces the conceptualization and institutionalization of laïcité in France by
beginning with a chapter-length overview followed by two chapters that examine the modern
conception and uses of laïcité from approximately 1989 to 2007. My analysis demonstrates how,
during this period, we can observe laïcité acting as a combative principle and cited as a reason
that Muslims and Arabs could not be integrated into French society. Chapter 1 serves to give
context for the following two chapters which take up the topic of laïcité in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. This chapter traces the history and evolution of the theory of laïcité from its origins
to the present day in order to reframe modern events and invocations of the principle. I look first
at Republicanism, the French political philosophy in which laïcité finds its justification both
historically and presently. I then describe the historical process by which laïcité was embedded
in French Republican thought from the French Revolution to the Fifth Republic, France’s current
government that was established in 1958. This chapter is rounded out by a final section that
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Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion, 25.
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explores the legacy of French colonialism and the ways in which Republican discourse rejects
Islam as late twentieth century immigration to France raised Islam to the nation’s second largest
religion.
Following this contextualizing chapter, Chapter 2 contends with the Chirac
administration’s interpretation and implementation of laïcité, centering on the question of the
Islamic headscarf. This chapter covers debates on the wearing of the female Islamic headscarf
and the 2004 law that banned ostensible signs of religion, namely the headscarf, from public
schools—a law passed by the National Assembly and signed into law by Chirac. It also uncovers
the link between racism, Islamophobia, and the failure of immigrant integration, showing how
laïcité was invoked to problematic ends in feminist arguments denouncing the headscarf and in
Republican arguments about protecting the laïque nature of the school. The most important
primary sources in this chapter are the 2004 Stasi Report and the 1989 petition titled “Profs, ne
capitulons pas!” (“Teachers, let us not give in!”). The Stasi Report is a legal report drafted by
Stasi Commission, a commission created by President Chirac to contemplate the meaning and
purpose of laïcité in modern France. In this report, the Stasi Commission suggests the law which
ultimately became the famous 2004 law banning the headscarf. The petition was drafted by a
group of French intellectuals in protest against the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public
schools after the expulsion of three scarved schoolgirls sparked national controversy on the role
of laïcité in national education. Essentially, this chapter serves to show how the Chirac
administration developed and popularized a certain perspective on laïcité based on racism, thus
generating a certain idea of what it means to be “French.”
Chapter 3 continues by looking at the contemporaneous contributions to national
discourse on laïcité by Chirac’s Minister of the Interior and presidential successor Nicolas
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Sarkozy. Gradually becoming Chirac’s political opponent, Sarkozy took a more nuanced and less
overtly racist approach to laïcité that often conflicted with Chirac’s views. By introducing his
new approach of “laïcité positive,” which he discussed at length in his book La République, les
religions, l’espérance (The Republic, Religions, and Hope), Sarkozy suggested a national
position that diverged from typical responses to the growing Muslim presence in France by
pushing for greater engagement with Muslim communities. Sarkozy’s views are also clarified by
speeches he delivered both nationally and internationally, as well as his creation of the French
Council for the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman). However, despite a surface
level commitment to breaking the taboo surrounding religion in France, touting tolerance as an
important value and increasing government engagement with Muslim groups, Sarkozy’s efforts
remained rooted in racism and an effort to control Islam in France rather than form a more
inclusive society.
As a whole, my thesis interrogates and challenges the dominant Republican narrative that
informs the French understanding of laïcité. What does laïcité really mean? How has
universalism been challenged by multiculturalism and social diversification in France? Does
laïcité, as it is conceived, remain applicable in modern France? We will begin by taking a look at
its origins.
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Chapter 1
Laïcité: Stable or Evolving? Universal or Particularistic?

This chapter will highlight some of the many legal and social developments that
demonstrate how the meaning of laïcité has morphed and shifted throughout history. Rather than
a static and monolithic principle, as is often claimed by traditional supporters of the French
Republic, or Republicans, its history demonstrates that laïcité is the subject of a dynamic
process. While laïcité lacks a linear path from its origins to the present, much of the political
discourse studied in this thesis shows that there is a Republican tendency to believe the contrary,
conceiving of laïcité as an exceptional principle—hence the oft-used phrase “la laïcité à la
française.” This view of laïcité as exceptional principle marks it as a foundational value of the
Republic, something inherently French and thus untranslatable, since, as explained in the
Introduction, “secularism” fails to capture the full extent of its socio-cultural significance. Laïcité
is so important, in fact, that many hold it on the same level as the three principles cited in the
Republic’s motto, tacking it on the end to create “Liberté, égalité, fraternité, laïcité.” In this
chapter, I examine the thread of laïcité’s history, pointing out how it is not as continuous and its
meaning not as stable as it may appear at first glance. I begin by delving into Republicanism, the
dominant political ideology in France that justifies and upholds laïcité. This section lays the
conceptual groundwork for understanding the history of laïcité’s development, which makes
constant reference to Republicanism and the promise of national unity. In a second section, I
recall the progression of historical events that enshrined laïcité as an eternal value in the French
imagination and which serve as reference points in modern debates on laïcité. Finally, I turn to
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France’s colonial history, a crucial topic often left out of discussions on laïcité. Tying France’s
history of colonialism to the large presence of Muslims and Arabs in present-day France, this
section considers why Islam is seen as a threat to laïcité and uncovers the reasons behind
Republicanism’s difficulty with accepting Islam.

Républicanisme and its Critics
A crucial concept in understanding modern invocations of laïcité, Républicanisme
(Republicanism) is the force behind the enshrinement of laïcité at the same level as the
fundamental principles named in the French Republic’s institutionalized motto. Republicanism
can be understood as a political philosophy aligned with the organization of society according to
the notion of a “general will,” a concept first theorized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Republicanism is also considered the opposite of political liberalism, which is founded on
individualism and is contrasted from French Republicanism as the “Anglo-Saxon model.”8
Religious Studies scholar François Gauthier explains that according to a Republican view of
society, “the Whole takes precedence over the parts[…] In other words, society is more than the
sum of the individuals that make it up[…] Republicanism is[…] based on a metaphysics of the
One, of unity, according to which social vitality is the natural fruit of cohesion.” 9 According to
this system, “the citizen is more valorized than the individual,” meaning that personal interests
must be suppressed in deference to the common good, indicating the need for a strong sense of

John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 20.
9 François Gauthier, “Républicanisme vs Libéralisme. Les Régimes de Laïcité et Leur Mise à l’épreuve,” Revue du
MAUSS 49, no. 1 (July 2017): 273-276. https://doi.org/10.3917/rdm.049.0269. Original text: “le Tout y prime sur les
parties[…] Autrement dit, la société est plus que la somme des individus qui la compose[…] Le républicanisme
s’appuie[…] sur une métaphysique de l’Un, de l’unité, suivant laquelle la vitalité sociale serait le fruit naturel de la
cohésion.”
8
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civic duty and love for la patrie (one’s country/homeland).10 It is important to note that
Republicanism does not belong to one side of the political aisle, but is embraced by actors from
both Left and Right.
The distinction between public and private space is the cornerstone upon which
Republicanism is grounded. “Public space is the realm of the political community, founded on
the citizen. It is the place of deliberation with a view to collective decision making, within a
framework permitted by solidarity [fraternité] and equality [égalité].”11 Within this conception
of society, the State is responsible for protecting public space from the encroachment of
particularisms from the private sphere, including religion. The State is thus responsible for
protecting the public sphere from the private. In contrast, liberalism protects individual rights
from the State. Republicanism argues that the neutrality of public space “permits the real liberty
of the citizen [invoking the third tenet of the national motto, liberté], beyond his social, familial,
religious, political, etc. determinations.”12 When it comes to religion, therefore, rather than
taking a position of ensuring the right of each individual to freely practice his faith, the State’s
primary aim is to assure that the public sphere is free from religion. In other words, rather than
merely upholding a principle that separates Church and State (secularism), in France, the very
conception and organization of society rests on this principle, distinguishing laïcité from
secularism through its increased emphasis as a pillar of society. Liberalism stands in great
contrast to this point, as the role of the State is not to free the individual from his particularistic
identities (whether these regard religion, gender, race, etc.) for the sake of national unity, but

Ibid., 274. Original text: “le citoyen est plus valorisé que l’individu.”
Ibid., 274. Original text: “L’espace public est le royaume de la communauté politique, fondée sur la citoyenneté.
C’est le lieu de la délibération en vue de la prise de décision collective, dans un cadre permis par la solidarité et
l’égalité.”
12 Ibid., 275. Original text: “La neutralité de l’espace public a pour visée de permettre la réelle liberté du citoyen,
par-delà ses déterminations sociales, familiales, religieuses, politiques, etc.”
10
11
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rather to ensure the ability of the autonomous individual to proclaim these identities as his civil
liberties.13
Critics of Republicanism denounce what they see as Republicanism’s dependence on a
kind of “violence” to the individual that takes place through the stripping of (what Republicans
may instead call a “freeing from”) individual identity markers in order to form a homogeneous
society built on sameness. Accordingly, Scott argues, Republicanism is based on “the eradication
of difference.”14 Republican universalism has been subject to sustained critiques for at least the
past two decades as France has grappled with integrating an increasingly religiously and racially
diverse population. Such insistence on equality through blindness to differences is the reason
behind the French government’s policy against recording data relating to religion, ethnicity, or
national origin in its census, as these figures would serve to create an image of a France
“fractured and divided, not—as it claims to be—a united, singular entity.”15
The Republican position both on the general construction of society and specifically the
role of religion within a society has become the basis for modern discussions of laïcité, allowing
Republicans to argue for a strict, arguably exclusionary neutrality of public space by drawing on
laïcité, Republicanism’s outgrowth, as a historical object. Since Republicanism and laïcité form
such a central, almost sacred piece of the French imagination, Republicans argue that this stance
is neutral. Gauthier counters this, however, arguing that “this neutrality of public space is not
neutral, not even close. The Republican universalism upon which this neutrality must open is
itself derived from a particularism constructed by history.” 16 Scott elaborates on this point,

See Merriam-Webster Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/liberalism.
Scott, The Politics of the Veil, 12.
15 Ibid.
16 Gauthier, “Républicanisme vs. Libéralisme,” 276. Original text: “Cette neutralité de l’espace public n’est pas
neutre, tant s’en faut. L’universalisme républicain auquel cette neutralité doit ouvrir est lui-même dérivé d’un
particularisme construit par l’histoire.”
13
14
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positing that “French citizens are ‘encumbered’ just as religious subjects are[…] for they
understand themselves in terms they did not choose; the notion of the individual as existing prior
to external influence masks its status as a cultural belief.” 17 Scott’s reading suggests that what
Republicans call universalism is actually tied to a particularism, that is, a circumscribed French
identity formed around eternal French values.
Republicanism’s particular approach to citizenship was developed during the French
Revolution, the most important period in defining modern French political philosophy. Emerging
at the close of the Enlightenment period, the French Revolution was steeped in philosophy of
scholars such as Rousseau, who advanced the idea of a unified populous in his Social Contract,
which contributed notably to the Republican values of liberté, égalité, fraternité (liberty,
equality, brotherhood). In reaction to the feudal structure of the ancien régime, with the notable
presence of the Catholic Church as a community identifier and a requisite to full participation in
civic life, the French Revolution’s breakthrough was its championing of the individual,
abstracted from his communal ties and endowed by the State with universal rights (liberté and
égalité), placing him on par with his fellow citizens, thus generating a sense of fraternité—the
basis for French universalism. 18 “In becoming a citizen,” Cécile Laborde explains, “the
individual abandons ‘minority’ and achieves ‘majority’[…] He [the citizen] is recognized as an
autonomous, rational individual capable of emancipating himself from social, religious, and
cultural determinisms.”19 While these values were largely developed from an anticlerical
perspective, thus seeking to abstract the citizen (the majority of whom were Catholic during this

Scott, The Politics of the Veil, 127-128.
Cécile Laborde, “Citizenship,” trans. Arthur Goldhammer, in The French Republic: history, values, debates, ed.
Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert, and Christophe Prochasson (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
2011), 137.
19 Ibid., 136-137.
17
18
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period) from his or her Catholic identity in political and social considerations, they were
nonetheless understood to be of universal applicability. The increasing presence of Islam in
France since the 1970s and 1980s has greatly challenged this notion of universalism, as I discuss
later.
The philosophical and political battles of the French Revolution were perceived as being
universally applicable and of central importance to discourse on human rights worldwide. 20 In
relinquishing ties to sub-national communities, citizens displayed their loyalty to “a set of
national institutions and a national history taken to embody universal values and through
participation in the public political sphere as a means of transcending individual interests[…] this
characterization of citizenship leaves us with a vision of the citizen as a ‘decontextualized
figure.’”21 In this way, the revolution formed an indivisible national community linked by its
commitment to the State, itself the representative body of the general will, the basis upon which
the social contract is constructed. The emergence of democratic citizenship thus marks a
divergence from traditional community identities which were replaced with this new contractual
identity of the individual and the citizen—an integral process in the French construction of
“modernity.”22
Though the value of universalism (which grew out of the values of liberté, égalité,
fraternité, and laïcité) emerged from a specific cultural context, it is often mythologized not only
as atemporal, but as a “French exception—” a view that remains at the core of modern French
political discourse despite the fact that multiculturalism has rendered the legacy of universalism
largely inoperative.23 As Cécile Laborde adroitly inquires, “Did republican citizenship function
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as a utopian critique of society, promising ultimate emancipation to all, or was it a norm that
generated exclusions and that makes sense only in relation to the boundary it established between
citizens and noncitizens?”24 The historical experience of French Jews as well as the entrance of
significant immigrant communities in the latter half of the twentieth century provides the
backdrop for interrogating this question and identifying the often hegemonic mobilization of
laïcité in ways that systematically excludes Muslims and non-Western European immigrants and
their descendants from mainstream French society. In this chapter, therefore, I will show several
examples of how the narrative that insists on the veracity of Republican universalism and an
unchanging and monolithic meaning of laïcité is in fact deceptive, and that laïcité in practice has
varied over time.

Inventing Laïcité: Key Moments in the History of a Term
Despite the Republican suggestion of laïcité’s historical continuity, laïcité, as I have
noted, has never been officially defined, allowing for its variable application over time. Lacking
robust historical and legal foundations, Bowen explains how “laïcité remains one of those
“essentially contested concepts” that is politically useful precisely because it has no agreed-on
definition. Or rather, it is useful for political debates because its use conveys the double illusion
that everyone knows what laïcité means and that this meaning has long been central to French
Republicanism.”25 This grants laïcité a sort of mythical status, providing a narrative framework
that allows it to be invoked by Republicans as “an historical object called ‘laïcité’” when in fact
there is no concrete “it.”26 Baubérot adds that, disguised as such, laïcité is “crushed beneath the
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weight of memory.”27 French historian Claude Nicolet’s attitude towards laïcité in his 1982 book
L’idée républicaine en France (The Republican Idea in France) underscores this notion of laïcité
as an assumed and inexorable concept by devoting only a few pages to it on the basis that “the
history [of laicity] is too well-known to dwell on.”28 However, this tendency to conceptualize
laïcité as a historical object and laïcisation, or secularization, as a process that happened in the
past, and is thus isolated there, fails to critically consider both the history of laïcité and the way it
continues to be interpreted in modern situations. In an attempt to make up for this discrepancy,
this chapter addresses some of the “holes” left untouched in the Republican narrative to
problematize both the conception and the modern pertinence of laïcité as it presently functions.
In the Republican imagination, laïcité has developed according to a linear schema where
it has become more profoundly ingrained as time has progressed. Sociologist Jean Baubérot has
pointed out that rather than treating laïcité as a dynamic process in constant interaction with
sociopolitical conditions, 29 Republicans continually insist on the absolute and unchanging nature
of the principle as a “hexagonal particularity.” 30 Bowen explains how, in this mode of thought,
laïcité has been written into history in a way that
provide[s] a narrative framework that permits public figures—politicians,
journalists, or public intellectuals—to speak as if there is an historical object called
‘laïcité’ that emerged from bitter struggles (the wars of religion, the Revolution,
the Paris Commune), led to the forming of a social contract (under the Third
Republic), and was enshrined in law (1905) and constitutions (1946, 1958). In this
account, laïcité represents the General Will and indicates the Common Good. It is
a Historical Actor. It must, therefore, have a philosophical base that then can be
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drawn on to derive new laws and regulations—such as regimenting the wearing of
religious signs in public space. 31
As Bowen then notes, the concreteness that this narrative lays on laïcité is misplaced in that it
ignores the lack of a stable definition of laïcité throughout history as well as the long history of
concessions made to the Catholic Church which in effect undermine the validity of these claims.
Instead, all that exists is “a series of debates, laws, and multiple efforts to assert claims over
public space.”32 A Republican “timeline” that Bowen described indicates the events that have
progressively enshrined laïcité as a core Republican value can be created from the reference
points listed in the above citation. In order to demonstrate how laïcité is not stable, I touch on
each of these plot points while weaving in those crucial topics and events not included on the
“Republican timeline” that must also be part of the story of laïcité.

As most histories of laïcité begin with the French Revolution—and since this is the first major
historical reference point for public figures discussing laïcité—the timeline beings here. The
importance of the French Revolution in modern discussions of laïcité is evident through the
importance of its bicentennial, which coincided with the first major, national controversy over
the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public schools in 1989. In this context, the Revolution was
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referenced as the event that sparked the development of French Republicanism. But how was
Republicanism formed during the French Revolution and how does this period inform modern
French history?
The French Revolution was a period of political, social, and religious upheaval that
occurred from 1789 to 1799 and included a series of complex revolutions and sub-divisions.
Without entering into the extensive and contentious scholarship on the French Revolution, for
our purposes it is worth briefly acknowledging the ways in which the Revolution contributed to
the development of laïcité.33 At the most basic level, the Revolution was a transformation of the
system of governance marked by the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the
Republic. The French monarchy, often referred to as the ancien régime, was a feudal system
under which the Catholic Church exercised significant control over the French populace. Prior to
the Revolution, the Church was the record-keeper of all births and deaths, meaning that
citizenship itself was closely tied to the Church. 34 At this time, to be French was to be Catholic.
The first major government policy aimed at curtailing the Roman Catholic Church’s 35
authority during the French Revolution is the passing of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in
1790 which reformed the organization of the Church. This law officially placed the Church
under the tutelage of the State, making a statement of temporal power (that of the State) over
spiritual power (the Church). Under this law, the Church became a public service and the clergy
functionaries paid by the State. This nationalization of the Church gave the State control over the
Church by placing it within its jurisdiction and thus limiting its power. Some historians such as
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Nicolas Roussellier have viewed this reform as a message that the sacred principle was now the
nation, and a sort of secular civil religion began to develop around this notion. The sacralization
of the State is demonstrated by a mandatory patriotic oath that required all functionaries,
including the clergy, to vow their obedience and loyalty to the revolution. 36 The birth of
Republicanism finds itself here, in the midst of an anticlerical movement aimed at founding a
Republic, a goal finally achieved in 1792. The founding of the Republic sacralized the
Revolution. In the years that followed, the State created a system of civil religion by
inaugurating national festivals to preserve the memory and values of the French Revolution. 37
Republicanism thus took on a quasi-religious character with the instatement of a new calendar
and new secular feast days replacing Catholic holidays. To this day, Bastille Day is the most
important public holiday in France, showing the importance of the Revolution as the foundation
upon which modern French society is constructed.
The importance of the Revolution as a cultural touchstone also arises in modern debates
on universalism in a now multicultural and multireligious France. These debates began in
earnest, rather symbolically, in the year that marks the bicentennial of the Revolution and
centered on the question of the Islamic headscarf in schools. The issue with headscarves is their
effect of announcing one’s religion in public and thus rendering the citizen no longer abstract,
thereby creating a sense of a non-unified society. Headscarves are seen as a challenge to
universalism, which Republicans insist is still the key to national unity, hence the hostility
towards them. However, using the French Revolution as a touchpoint in the anti-headscarf
agenda can be interpreted as an “objectification of the republic as the embodiment of immutable
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principles” because it treats these principles as monolithic, despite the fluctuations that occurred
in the two centuries that followed. 38 Rather than rethinking the meaning and purpose of
universalism in the context of a France with a growing immigrant population, insistence on this
revolutionary value “render[ed] nonnegotiable exactly that which had to be negotiated: the
integration of different individuals and different kinds of individuality into a nation which had
never been as homogeneous as its self-styled representatives claimed it to be.” 39 Even before
France became a nation of peoples from a wide variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds,
though, the school was considered a place that integrates students from various regional and
religious backgrounds into the singular national culture. This brings us to the next major point on
the Republican timeline, the Third Republic’s Ferry laws on education.
In summary, the Ferry laws rendered primary education free, compulsory, and laïc. These
laws mark the birth of the public school as the site of citizen-formation through the inculcation of
Republican values. Jules Ferry, minister of education during the 1880s, is regarded as a
“Republican hero” who molded the public school for the first time in French history into a laïc
space through a series of laws between 1879 and 1886.40 According to these laws, all instructors
had to be laïc, meaning that members of the clergy were no longer authorized to work as
schoolteachers. The French Senate’s Archives describe the effect of the Ferry laws: “By laïcisant
[secularizing] the school, they [the laws] wanted to free consciences from the influence of the
Church and strengthen the country by training citizens of all [social] classes on the same [school]
benches.”41 To this end, an 1881 law established primary education absolutely free of charge in
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public schools and an 1882 law made primary education obligatory for all children from ages six
to thirteen, creating a system in which all citizens would be equalized by receiving the same
education.42 In a continuation of the “cultural war” between the Church and Republicans, it
became clear that to control education was to control the future of French culture, and these laws
indicated Republican fears of the social influence still held by the Church. 43
Through these laws, the Third Republic established the school as one of the most
important places that embodies and promulgates laïcité. Because of the school’s importance, its
neutrality is a sort of barometer for the wellbeing of laïcité even in modern times, making it a
contentious battleground for debates on this matter. Conservative political philosopher Blandine
Kriegel, who served as advisor to President Jacques Chirac, chairperson of the High Council on
Integration, and is a frequent member of commissions to address important social issues,
identified the importance of the school, discovering “the roots of the French state-society
relationship in an even older history of political thought[…] She locates its origins in the Greek
idea that the citizens were the state. In Sparta, it was only after finishing public education and
partaking of a public meal that one became a full citizen.” 44 In this way, attending public school
remains a crucial civic duty and is the process by which one becomes truly “French.” This
recollection of ancient Greece also demonstrates the emphasis placed on calling upon historical
values to defend and validate the Republican conception of the school, as references to the values
of ancient republics have, since the First French Republic, served as an important touchpoint in
the formation of French Republican thought.
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Another important Ferry law passed in 1880 dealt with secondary education for young
women. During the Napoleonic period, secondary education at lycées was only available for
boys, but Ferry’s 1880 law extended the reach of secondary education for young women by
establishing public lycées.45 Though at first glance this may seem like a step in the direction of
gender equality, the true motive behind increasing the accessibility of secondary education for
women was again to advance Republican thought and minimize the influence of the Catholic
Church. Due to women’s general lack of access to secondary education, religion and the Church
had managed to maintain more of a grasp on them while men were becoming more and more
laïc.46 To manage this “problem,” Republicans took young girls as an important subject, even
though they were not considered citizens and did not receive the right to vote until 1945.
Women’s education became an important method through which to form young women into
informed future wives and caregivers for children, equipping them with the knowledge to
instruct their children—future French citizens—in laic modes of thought rather than perpetuating
Christian morality.
The legal report from the 1880 law expounds a defense for increasing the accessibility of
girls’ education that is rooted in concerns of the Church’s power over women, positing laic
education as a means of mitigating this problem. I cite at length from the legal report to
demonstrate how women’s education was treated as a political project aimed at advancing the
Third Republic’s conception of laïcité:
It [the law] is not political, it is social in the highest and purest sense of the word,
for society is based upon the family, and the family is what women make it. While
the man struggles and works outside, the woman raises the children. As she nursed
their bodies, she nurses their minds; she is their first and sometimes their only
teacher; she cultivates their faculties, develops their feelings, their tastes, their
moral ideas; she prepares them for practical life, and society receives them from
45
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her hands imbued with her lessons and examples, whose memory is more lasting
than any other. (...) And since all the political parties agree in the same thought on
the usefulness of good morals, they cannot differ in their opinions on the usefulness
of women's education.47
This citation describes how this law also served to mitigate the classic division within the family
of a Christian mother and a laïc, freethinker father.48 Suspicions that the “two Frances”
persisted—an idea that emerged during the French Revolution whereby French society was
divided between Catholic royalists and anticlerical Republicans (where women tended to remain
loyal to the Church)—proved a valid reason for increasing women’s access to education.
Educating women, Republicans hoped, would finally sever their lingering ties to the Church and
end the battle of the “two Frances.” Women were, and are still seen as having an indelible impact
on society through their role as caregivers, or future caregivers, and in this way they are
responsible for the formation of morals in the Republic’s children. The caretaker role is, at least
to some extent, a role imposed on women that serves to shift their primary social value from
themselves as autonomous individuals (which women were not considered to be at the time of
this law) to their presumed ability to bear children.
This sexist position renders women and girls into political objects that must be leveraged
if they are to manufacture the desired result—in this case, as reproducers and promulgators of
secular Republican values. Just as the school in general remains central in modern debates about
laïcité, girls’ education also retains its particular importance as a signifier of the state of laïcité in
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the school. Scott explains the link between the Third and Fifth Republics’ focus on girls’
education, pointing out that “the old concern about women and religion[…] was transposed in
2003 onto Islam,” where the ostensible pressure imposed on Muslim girls by “their fathers,
brothers, and imams to wear headscarves recalled the once formidable power of Catholic
priests.”49 In this way, Scott elucidates the link between early Republican thinking in the Third
Republic and the continuity in Republican thought in that girls’ education remains an important
point of contention in modern debates.
The third point on the Republican timeline of laïcité is the law of 1905 that officially
separated Church and State and which is “still the law of legal reference” today. 50 This law
ended the Concordat of Napoleon that was established in 1804 and stayed in place for the
entirety of the approximately one-hundred year interim, during which France witnessed a series
of very different political regimes. Under the Concordat, the State managed the status of the
Church according to an agreement with the pope where the Church regained its status as a central
institution, but remained under the jurisdiction of the State as one of three recognized religions:
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism. 51 While all three of these religions were granted the
acceptance and the protection of the State, the Concordat model granted Catholicism a privileged
status in recognizing that it was the religion of the majority. The law of 1905 was thus a serious
change of course from concordatory France, moving from the mindset that “temporal power is
superior to spiritual power” to a complete separation of the two categories.52
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The two main aspects of this law were the assurance of religious liberty and the complete
dissociation of the State from religions by eliminating the budget for religions recognized by the
State. Article One of the law reads: “The Republic guarantees freedom of conscience. It
guarantees the free exercise of religious worship subject only to the restrictions set out below in
the interest of public order.”53 The second principle is laid out at the beginning of Article Two,
which states: “The Republic does not recognize, pay salaries or subsidize any religion.
Consequently[…] all expenditures relating to the practice of religious worship shall be
eliminated from the budgets of the State, departments and municipalities.” 54 This law officially
and totally separated the Church from the State, making it no longer a part of public life, but
rather a private institution separated financially, politically, and symbolically from the State. 55
According to Scott, this separation “was intended to secure the allegiance of individuals to the
republic and so break the political power of the Catholic church.” 56 The Pope and many in the
Catholic community were greatly displeased by this law that finally removed Catholicism from
its centuries-long position as a recognized piece of cultural heritage—a position that even the
French Revolution had not effaced.
Due in part to the Church’s refusal to accept the 1905 law, France passed new laws from
1907 to 1908 that turned over ownership of church buildings to the government, thereby
recoiling slightly from the severity of the 1905 law and entwining the State once more with
religion—to some extent—as it relates to property. These new provisions meant that the State
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assumed financial responsibility for the upkeep of these properties which were technically
public, but which were used for free by religious communities. However, as Bowen points out,
this provision applied only to religious edifices constructed prior to 1905, “which means that
today, [the] government subsidizes the Catholic religion far more than it does other religions.
The vast majority of Catholic church buildings are subsidized by the State or by municipal
governments, whereas such is the case for only about one-half the Protestant churches and 10
percent of the Jewish temples in France,” not to mention an extremely slim number of mosques,
as Islam was the last religion to install itself in France.57 This tendency to implicitly—and
sometimes explicitly—favor Catholicism is still evident in the rhetoric of French presidents and
ministers as well as in governmental policies, as we shall see in the following two chapters.
Though the 1905 law is the modern basis for laïcité, the word fails to appear in the very
law that, as Scott notes, “is celebrated as its embodiment.”58 Instead, the Constitutions of the
Fourth and Fifth French Republics were the first documents to legally enshrine laïcité. Article
One of the Constitution of 1946 reads: “France is an indivisible, laïque, democratic, and social
Republic.”59 Article One of the 1958 Constitution’s Preamble repeats this affirmation, while
specifying that the Republic “assures the equality before the law of all citizens without
distinction as to origin, race, or religion. It respects all beliefs.”60 These Constitutions, listing
laïcité alongside the Republic’s most sacred values, consecrated laïcité once and for all as a
central tenet of the Republic. These documents still failed, however, to define laïcité, making it
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malleable and therefore allowing for a wide variety of sometimes contradictory invocations of
the term.

Where does Islam fit in? Orientalism and The Colonial Legacy
So far, this chapter has outlined the concept of Republicanism as well as the historical
events and debates as they relate to the formation and development of laïcité in France. This
narrative fails to mention a concurrent story—France’s colonial history in North and West
Africa. If we are to understand the function and meaning of laïcité in modern France, we must
account for how the colonial legacy propagates an image of the “other” and counterposes laïcité
to the perceived values of former colonial subjects. France’s involvement in Africa is the
primary reason that it now finds itself the European nation with the largest Muslim population, a
population it seeks to regulate and control. The French colonial empire was expansive, but its
North African colonies—Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria—are most implicated in debates around
the question of Islam in France. French journalist Rokhaya Diallo points out that “Those who
generate fear are very often Arabs and what we call ‘Islamophobia’ strangely resembles
‘Arabophobia.’ Other Muslims, such as Blacks, do not seem to worry many people. Without a
doubt the colonial clichés of the violent and bloodthirsty Arab, as opposed to the naïve and
childish Black, incite people to fear the former more.”61 In this excerpt Diallo breaks down the
kind of racism that I address throughout this thesis: a racism based on fear of the Arab, a vestige
of colonialism, that is often if not always paired with fear of Islam.
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Beginning with the violent French conquest of Algeria in 1830, French colonialism’s
“civilizing mission” has imprinted France with lasting ideas of Western superiority over all those
representing the East—finding a target in immigrants and their descendants. This civilizing
mission, aimed at bringing secular, Republican, universalist values to “uncivilized” cultures—
largely through education in the French system—was justified by the claim that France, a
liberated society and a symbol of modernity, was obligated to free inferior cultures from their
archaic traditions. Broadly speaking, this mission pitted France, “the West,” against “the East” as
an almost mystical entity representing one of France’s “deepest and most recurring images of the
Other.”62 This colonial attitude is defined by Edward Said as orientalism, a mindset that
caricaturizes the “East” and imagines a firm binary between it and the “West.” In contrasting
itself with the imagined “Orient,” the West pits itself against its perceived Eastern enemy—an
entity so different that this binary can never be abolished. Here lies the paradox of the civilizing
mission. The civilizing mission’s stated goal was to civilize, but in light of the Orientalist French
attitude, this effort was directed at those who were inherently incapable of being civilized. 63 This
attitude has persisted in modern France, finding expression in discrimination against immigrants
and those of foreign origin. While Republican universalism promises to be a French exception
capable of integrating all people, there is widespread belief that “immigrants” cannot be
integrated, thus undermining the notion of universalism as truly universal or exceptional. This
same paradox of the civilizing mission has simply been transposed into modern issues.
Nevertheless, the French presence remained strong in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
Twentieth-century wars generated demands for additional labor, leading France to grant
Algerians (men only) the right to immigrate to France, thus marking the first major influx of
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Arab immigrants to the French mainland. 64 While the expectation was that these immigrants
would return to their countries of origin when they were no longer needed, the post-WWII period
instead witnessed increasing numbers of entire families settling in France. The Algerian War
erupted shortly thereafter in 1954, ending in the French government’s surrender to the Algerian
National Liberation Front. President Charles de Gaulle defended this concession in racist terms,
affirming that Algerian independence was the best thing for France, as continued French
dominance of Algeria would pose a threat of France being inundated with Muslims, an event that
would disturb the French who he called “a European people of the white race[…] and the
Christian religion.”65 In this statement, de Gaulle too undermines and negates the promise of
universalism by suggesting that some people cannot be abstracted from their racial and religious
identities and by defining French society through particularisms: whiteness and Christianity.
Many Algerians continued to settle in France where they were not welcomed by many
native French, reinforcing orientalist attitudes through continued cultural hegemony that insisted
that these “Easterners” would never become part of French society. Former colonial subjects on
French soil quickly became the “enemy within,” 66 fueling a rise in xenophobic, far-right political
views that were represented in national politics with the founding of Le Pen’s National Front
(FN) party in 1972. The FN’s continued prominence and normalization in mainstream politics
indicate the sustained presence of strong anti-“immigrant” and anti-Islamic sentiments in France
today. This nationalist response manifests as a rejection of Islam, a concrete signifier of these
“foreigners.” As Diallo explains, “The will to eradicate all symbols of the lasting presence of
Islam in France is rather the manifestation of the fear of its rootedness and the will to keep it
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outside of the ‘[French] national identity.’”67 This sentiment held by many nationalist French
further reveals that the universalist “promise” requires sameness that is reached by cultural
assimilation to historical French values and that those who do not share this heritage cannot be a
part of the unified social body.

Conclusion
The years following Algerian independence have been fraught with conflict between
immigrant descendants and French society, from which this group has been systematically
excluded. Islam has been targeted as antithetical to laïcité and Republican values due to its
perceived communalist tendencies. The female headscarf (voile) in particular has become the
center of debates on this topic, allowing critics to hone in on a tangible object that lies at the
intersection of three very important Republican talking points: gender equality, the school, and
laïcité. As this chapter has revealed that the emphasis on the foundational nature of sexual
equality to laïcité is misleading, this claim is nevertheless, in the words of sociologist Eric
Fassin, “a way of insisting on the immutability of the republic in its current incarnation.” 68
The idea of sexual equality as a primordial French value lends itself to a binary opposition
between Muslims and France, where, due to Muslims’ apparent rejection of sexual equality, they
are considered “not only inferior—[but] less evolved, if capable at all of evolution.”69 This
process exemplifies continued Western cultural hegemony, as politicians draw “simplified lines
of division between the traditional and the modern, the repressive and the emancipatory. In its
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current version, secularism has become synonymous with (an ill-defined) gender equality that
distinguishes West from East, the Christian secular from the Islamic.” 70 Such an orientalist
attitude demonstrates how Republican France continues to understand and define itself in
opposition to Islam and its corresponding “counter-Republican” values.
Building on of the foundations laid in this chapter on Republicanism and laïcité, the
following two chapters discuss the debates on Islam’s place in laïque France that took place
during the early 2000s, revealing inconsistencies and shortcomings in the conception of
universalist Republican values as well as the awkwardness with which France continues to
grapple with integrating a part of its population it still considers to be incapable of integration.
Broadly speaking, these chapters reveal France’s failure to adapt in the face of multiculturalism
and the ways in which stubborn attachments to historic values serve to perpetuate racism and
Islamophobia. In the next chapter, I consider what may be called modern France’s first major
cultural reckoning with Islam, the question of the acceptability of the Islamic headscarf in public
schools. In debates about the affaires du voile (veil affairs), Republicans denounced the presence
of the veil, a religious sign, in the Republican sanctuary. Grounding their arguments in laïcité,
the veil was portrayed as a symbol of Islam’s suppression of women and a breaching of the
public-private boundary that is central to laïcité. On a cultural level, this period witnessed a
reassertion of the idea that Islam and French society cannot go together, where the veil
symbolized the Muslim’s inability to be abstracted and integrated.
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Chapter 2
The School vs. the Veil: Gender Equality and the Republican Policing of Public Space

On October 3, 1989, three Muslim schoolgirls were expelled from their middle school
(collège) in the Parisian suburb of Creil for refusing to remove their headscarves. 71 This was the
first of many similar instances that came to be commonly referred to as affaires du voile (veil
affairs), where scarved schoolgirls were accused of disturbing the neutrality and laïc nature of
the classroom space by pronouncing their religious affiliation through their dress and
subsequently expelled from school or otherwise penalized. While the State Council (Conseil
d’État) responded to the issue by advising schools to deal with the affairs on a case-by-case
basis, tensions continued to escalate, rendering the voile affairs an important part of the cultural
landscape during Chirac’s presidency. 72 As Joan Wallach Scott argues in her book The Politics
of the Veil, the voile became a two-pronged symbol representing both the “problem of Islam” and
the presence of an entire Arab/North African/Muslim population that France was struggling to
integrate.73 While the principle of laïcité was cited in defense of arguments against the voile, the
issue reached far beyond the religious realm into issues such as immigrant integration, poverty,
and racism. Republican critics increasingly denounced the veil as a symbol of gender inequality
in Islam, as laïcité simultaneously became a referent for arguments based on gender equality,
thus intertwining the anti-veil agenda with certain strains of French feminism. In other words, the
voile affairs “exposed the crisis the nation was confronting: how to reconcile an increasingly
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multicultural population with a universalism that precluded the recognition of cultural and social
differences.”74
In this chapter I elucidate the ways in which laïcité was mobilized against the veil by
serving as a defense of the Republican school and through its equation with gender equality. First
I look at the State’s response to the veil affairs through the Stasi Commission and the 2004 law,
explaining how these governmental actions aimed to maintain the Republican social order based
on universalism by legally mandating the removal of signs of Muslim religiosity from public
spaces. In the second section I consider how gender became implicated in discourse surrounding
the veil in a way that deceptively equated laïcité with gender equality and Islam with gender
inequality. I then draw our attention to the school, explaining how, despite its intention of
reinforcing the neutrality of this Republican social pillar, the 2004 law actually undermined the
public education system. Finally, I return to the question of gender insofar as the voile affairs
generated feminist responses both against and in support of the wearing of the veil. This section
demonstrates how anti-voile feminisms are rooted in orientalist attitudes that inaccurately reduce
the veil to a symbol of oppression and inadvertently reproduce social differences through racism.
One of the key documents examined in this chapter is the Stasi Report published in 2004
by the Stasi commission, which was established by President Chirac in order to reflect on the
application of the principle of laïcité in light of the ever-increasing tensions surrounding the
place of the voile in public schools.75 Presided over by Bernard Stasi, Chirac tasked the
commission to “give the most concrete sense to the demands implied by the principle of laïcité:
the neutrality of public services, respect for pluralism, religious freedom, freedom of expression,
but also the strengthening of cohesion and fraternity among citizens, equal opportunities, the
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refusal of discrimination, gender equality, and the dignity of women.” 76 The commission’s
undertaking was couched in the language of laïcité but was in fact much broader and referenced
“the difficulties of integration of those who arrived on the national territory over the course of
these past decades [read: Muslims and those of Arab descent].” 77 Though laïcité was the primary
matter at hand, the commission’s discussions also brought in sociological issues insofar as the
religious identity of these immigrants was perceived as precluding their social integration and
resulted in “[poor] living conditions in numerous suburbs (banlieues) of our cities,
unemployment, the sentiment felt by many of those who live on our territory to be the object of
discriminations, namely to be pushed out of the national community, [which] explain[s] […why]
they lend a kind ear to those who incite them to fight what they call the values of the
Republic.”78
In the eyes of Republican traditionalists, “immigrants” (a word signifying all those of
Arab/North African origin, even those who are French citizens or were born and raised in
France) posed a threat to the Republican social order and national unity by introducing
unfamiliar social differences that diverged from traditional French culture. The role of the
commission, then, was to determine how to deal with the differences of this ethno-religious
minority that were threatening the unity of French society. This resulted in the ultimate passing
of a law in January 2004 that prohibited “the wearing of a conspicuous religious sign—large
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cross, yarmulke, or veil,” in public schools and for public functionaries.79 As Scott asserts, “the
headscarf ban became a definitive pronouncement: there would no longer be compromises or
mediation—it was either Islam or the republic.”80 The Stasi Commission was thus the creator of
a law that promoted the erasure of religious difference, specifically of Muslims, from public
space. This effort sought to maintain national unity, but it came at the expense of religious
freedom.

Laïcité and the Maintenance of Social Order
Laïcité is a key principle in ensuring universalism, that is, the basis of the Republican
social order. Following the definition of Republicanism that we have seen in Chapter 1,
removing visible displays of difference such as the headscarf from public spaces allows these
spaces to become neutral, creating a harmonious civil society which thrives through unity. The
Stasi commission reaffirmed this principle in their report which reads: “Our political philosophy
was founded on the defense of the unity of the social body. This concern for uniformity
outweighed any expression of difference perceived as menacing[…] Laïcité today is being
challenged to forge unity while respecting the diversity of society.” 81 However, that unity is
achieved at the expense of erasure. Rather than promoting tolerance or acceptance of the
heterogenization of French society, a stance which may have allowed laïcité to be “understood as
a platform for the negotiation of difference instead of as its erasure,” the government ultimately
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took a strong stand against headscarves. 82 This exclusionary position reveals the French
government’s continued attachment to universalism via the suppression of the private sphere,
and adherence to this principle has arguably become even stronger now that the private sphere
indicates not only Christianity and Judaism, but a newer French religion—Islam. The
government’s hardline approach shows its inability to adapt to the nation’s demographic changes
in a way that ensures equality, and its tendency to stubbornly insist on the applicability of
historic principles in the face of novel situations that were not foreseen at the time of their
conception. By failing to adjust or even critically (re)consider the meaning and implementation
of universalism and the function of the school in a significantly less homogeneous France, the
2004 law fails to address the problem it set out to solve.
In the context of an increasingly multicultural France, with a large Muslim and
Arab/North African population, tensions emerged “between the definition of France as a nation
‘one and indivisible,’ in which difference was rendered invisible, and the increasing social and
cultural diversity of its population.”83 Despite the fact that there were fewer than 1500 Muslim
schoolgirls wearing the voile,84 it became a powerful symbol of “otherness” precisely because it
was so visible and reinforced the image of the oppressed Muslim woman. This visual assertion of
otherness lent itself to the generation of a presumed “homogeneous and dangerous ‘other’
[which] secured a mythic vision of the French republic, one and indivisible.”85 Here the voile
designates not only a religious group, but “a much larger population, a whole ‘culture’ at odds
with French norms and values. The symbolism of the veil reduces differences of ethnicity,
geographic origin, and religion to a singular entity, a ‘culture’ that stands in opposition to
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another singular entity, republican France.”86 The cementation of “the Muslim” as a singular
entity in the French imagination reinforced laïcité as an exceptional and monolithic principle that
is the opposite of Islam. Baubérot challenges this depiction by conceptualizing laïcité instead as
“a dynamic process in constant interaction with sociopolitical conditions.”87 In the context of a
now multicultural France, laïcité was, as Baubérot suggests, not an idle principle, but a tool used
to advance assimilationist policies. Furthermore, this period witnessed the attachment of gender
equality to the meaning of laïcité for the first time in the term’s history, allowing Republicans to
denounce Islam and uphold laïcité on these grounds. As I discus later in this chapter, this change
in the meaning of laïcité shows how the principle is not as stable as Republicans believe, but was
in fact redefined in contrast to Islam as Islam became progressively more rooted in French
society.
Though repeatedly described with reverence in the Stasi Commission report and among
the French population at large, the inability to reimagine the modern function of laïcité marks a
fundamental shortcoming of the government’s interpretation of this “cornerstone of the
republican pact.”88 Rather than, as Baubérot advocated, treating laïcité as a dynamic process in
constant interaction with sociopolitical conditions, 89 the Stasi commission responded with a
knee-jerk, nationalistic reaction that insisted on the absolute and uncompromising nature of
French laïcité. Replete with rigid claims that laïcité is a “hexagonal particularity,”90 the Stasi
Report is a perfect example of the way laïcité has been written into history in a way that makes
its meaning appear more concrete than it is. Indeed, in his lettre de mission to the commission,
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Chirac identifies both the Constitution (of the Fifth Republic) and the 1905 law in order to
underscore the importance of laïcité, which he refers to as “the fruit of a long historic tradition”
and as a principle which is “deeply rooted in our institutions.” 91 Additionally, the Stasi Report
affirms that “the law of 1905 must remain the foundation (le socle) of ‘living together’ (vivre
ensemble) in France.”92 As Bowen notes, however, and as I have demonstrated in Chapter 1, this
concreteness is misplaced in that it ignores the lack of a stable definition of laïcité throughout
history as well as the long history of concessions made to the Catholic Church which in effect
undermine the validity of these claims. Instead, all that exists is “a series of debates, laws, and
multiple efforts to assert claims over public space.”93 Politicians invoked laïcité as a historical
entity even though no such thing existed and “no easy deductions of new laws from old
principles were possible. What ensued were tempestuous debates about what laïcité should be
and how Muslims ought to act, not in light of a firm legal and cultural framework, but in light of
a disappearing sense of certitude about what France was, is, and will be.” 94
Baubérot argues that this misplaced certitude among those who defend French
exceptionalism is due to laïcité’s present importance in the definition of French identity. 95
Presented as an unquestionable and immutable component of French Republican identity, those
who wore headscarves were seen as rejecting this crucial component of French culture and
negating the legacy of French history by refusing to be seen as anonymous, abstract individuals
in the public sphere. To the extent that laïcité is “changing from a process to a movement,” and
from a principle at the institutional level to a matter of identity, “[it] is becoming a hegemonic
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reality.”96 Women and girls wearing the voile, as well as the Franco-Arab population in general,
were met with what can be considered militant secularism aimed at maintaining social order by
suppressing differences. This militant secularism was “conceived as the truth of French national
identity rather than as the ground on which such identity could be negotiated.”97 By the simple
act of wearing headscarves, “immigrants” were seen as inherently resisting integration and
favoring communal ties over French nationalism. Those who supported a law banning
headscarves called themselves “apostles of secularism,” a title which highlights the importance
of laïcité as a French identity marker. 98 The Stasi Report reaffirms the importance of laïcité to
national identity, declaring: “[Laïcité] supposes a dynamic intellectual attitude, opposite to the
lazy posture of simple neutrality. It is a problem which goes above spiritual and religious
questions because it concerns society in all its components. Laïcité thus affects national identity
[and] the cohesion of the social body…” which is the basis for French social order. 99 The
centrality of laïcité to French identity and the perceived resistance posed by French Muslims,
specifically French Muslim women and girls, made it a threat to social order and hence the
grounds for debates and the passing of new laws intended to protect French Republicanism.
Protecting Republicanism, then, was a matter of controlling not just Muslim identities, but
Muslim women’s identities. In this context, laïcité became a method of controlling Muslim
women’s very existence in public space, a way for the Republic to stipulate what was and was
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not acceptable in a Republican society whose social order rests on the maintenance of
homogeneity.

The Conflation of Laïcité and Gender Equality
In addition to the defense of the 2004 law on the basis of the neutrality of schools, sexual
equality and women’s rights formed another major argument against the voile. For supporters of
the law, the voile was seen as a tool of the patriarchy and a visible manifestation of women’s
submission to this social hierarchy. In the reports of both commissions tasked with evaluating the
role of laïcité—the Stasi commission and the National Assembly’s commission presided by
Jean-Louis Debré—the voile is described as a harmful symbol of the subjugation of women who
should instead be empowered through the Republic by experiencing true liberty at school. True
liberty, the reports argued, could only be attained by removing the voile, a sign of oppression.
The voile “cannot be reduced to a simple sign of religious belonging,” states the Debré report. “It
often conveys, if it is not always the case, a political will to assert a difference and, perhaps even
more, a certain idea of the image and of the place of women in society.”100 In the Stasi report,
numerous references suggested that laïcité was closely tied to gender equality. For example, the
Stasi Report asserts: “Today, laïcité cannot be conceived without a direct link with the principle
of equality between the sexes.”101 If this assertion is to hold any truth, the word “today” is
imperative, as Scott points out that “gender equality did not become a primordial value for
French politicians until this century and then only in contrast to Islam.” 102 Just as Muslims are
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viewed as being so inextricably linked to a religious identity that precludes their abstraction and
thus their integration, until about seventy-five years ago, women too were believed to be so tied
to their sex that they were incapable of abstraction and thus they were not citizens and could not
vote. One has only to recall the 1880 Ferry law on girls’ education to see how laïcité was once in
fact based on the inequality of the sexes. But why were women seen as incapable of abstraction
and individualism whilst men were? Taking a look at the France’s journey towards gender
equality will help us to better contextualize the modern emphasis on French Muslim women.
According to the values of French Republicanism, one must be an abstract individual in
order to merit citizenship. The French concept of universalism stems from here, as all
individuals, abstracted from their external ties, become all alike and equal, thus forming a unified
society. But “was the sameness of individuals an effect of the law’s abstraction or a prerequisite
for it? Could the law’s abstraction override the dictates of nature—” i.e. women’s innate
differences from men?103 Until the mid-twentieth century, Republicans answered this question
with a firm “no.” Women were not autonomous, and thus were not able to be dissociated from
the group constituted by their sex, making them, by definition, not individuals and so not worthy
of citizenship. Scott explains how men were differentiated by their “ability to reason and
contemplate, [which] distinguishes them from women, whose bodies interfere with access to
higher thought. ‘The internal influence continually recalls women to their sex,’ wrote a French
scientist echoing Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘the male is male only at certain moments, but the
female is female throughout her life.’”104 This logic served to legitimate the denial of female
suffrage until 1945. Women could not be citizens because their sex inherently differentiated
them from men, who were not tied to their sex and therefore were true individuals. In order for
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women to become citizens, a new logic had to be derived whereby the universal citizen was
regarded as either male or female, but this difference was simply noted rather than ranked—the
two sexes could at once be different and equal. 105 This argument is of course paradoxical in its
attempt to reassert universalism while simultaneously acknowledging inherent differences—
precisely that which universalism claims does not exist.
While nineteenth and twentieth century feminists were sure to frame their ideas in
Republican terms, arguing “for equality for all citizens, [and] not that men and women differ in
an essential way nor that women as a class should have collective rights,” this logic does not
hold up against the idea of universalism. 106 When women were enfranchised in 1945, it was not
as individuals that they received the right to vote, but as a particular group—a development
seemingly contrary to Republican logic. 107 Nevertheless, France later passed an electoral parity
law in 2002 that set quotas for the number of women who must be included on parties’ electoral
lists. This law was once again defended from a universalist approach. 108 However, any
universalist defense of policies directed towards women as a group is paradoxical. Since
proponents of the electoral parity law were “invoking ‘women’ as a political category in order to
achieve equality,” they highlighted difference and not unity. 109 Despite these lapses, women’s
journey from disenfranchisement to being accepted as full citizens lays a potential path for other
groups that are not necessarily disenfranchised, but are demanding social and legal recognition,
only to be denounced as communalist and raising up unnecessary differences, making it their
fault that they have not been integrated into French society. 110 Just as women were once not
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considered individuals, French Muslims, especially women, now find themselves in this position,
believed to be so bound to their religion that they are not abstract. Unlike the historical
movement for women’s rights, however, where their sex was seen as a natural difference,
Muslims introduce an “‘unnatural’ difference” that, if recognized by the State, “will rend the
social fabric and weaken the body of the nation,” making their integration much more difficult to
envision.111
Despite France’s own history of gender inequality, modern claims that “equality between
the sexes and the dignity of women” is a “requirement [exigence] implied by the principle of
laïcité” override historical truths.112 The conflation of laïcité and gender equality enabled
feminists and Republicans to decry veiling as a practice of fundamentalist and political Islam,
framing those who wear the voile as victims of familial and social pressures, forced to wear the
voile against their will. The Republic then charges itself with an emancipatory mission to save
these girls from “suffering and humiliation” by maintaining, for the sake of these girls, the
secular school as “a place of liberty and emancipation.”113
However, the emphasis placed on gender equality as a foundational value of the Republic
glosses over not only the nation’s own long journey towards gender equality, but also the
inequalities that still exist in French society. Sexual equality, like laïcité, is not immutable. The
Stasi Report’s declaration that “The Republic cannot remain deaf to the cry of distress of these
young [scarved Muslim] girls” reveals not concerns regarding sexual equality, but a desire to
recolonize the former colonial subject articulated in sexist terms.114 In this narrative, the modern
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French Republic becomes a sort of almighty savior to the helpless Arab girl who is oppressed by
the weight of tradition. This process exemplifies Western cultural hegemony that began during
the colonial era and continues as the Republic frames veiled women as victims who need to be
saved from their “culture” by the white Republican emancipator. These politicians demonstrated
an extreme oversimplification of the “Islam problem” by understanding the conflict as binary,
pitting Islam and Arab culture in total opposition to laïque French society. The former was
painted as a symbol of oppressive traditionalism that contrasted with the modern freedoms
guaranteed by the Republic. As gender equality was increasingly perceived as consubstantial
with laïcité, it took on a mythical and foundational status that bolstered laïcité’s attack on Islam.
As Scott explains, the attribution of laïcité to the “enduring quality” of gender equality, even
though categorizing gender equality as an “enduring quality” is misleading, “gives it [laïcité]
something of a religious aspect, as fundamentalist as the Islam to which it is counterposed.” 115
As Scott’s argument puts forth, gender equality emerged as an integral French value from the
process of reaction against the perceived inequality among French Muslims.
In fact, Scott points out the hypocrisy of the response that invoked gender equality as an
inherent characteristic of laïcité given that, in reality, “gender inequality was fundamental to the
articulation of the separation of church and state that inaugurated Western modernity [emphasis
mine].”116 A predisposition to glorifying all things French, however, led to a defensive insistence
on the equality modern French society had managed to attain. “Concern with gender inequality,”
therefore, was “limited to Muslims and[…did] not extend to French[…] practices that also
permit the subordination of women. It is as if patriarchy were a uniquely Islamic
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phenomenon!”117 The feminist debate surrounding the headscarf was thus pared down to an
overly-simplistic argument that Republican France represented all things modern and
emancipatory whilst Islam and, by proxy, the entire “immigrant” culture, represented the exact
opposite. Though not stated in these terms, advocates for the law banning the headscarf believed
that Muslim women could be emancipated only through this forced assimilation to Republican
values that effectively erased all “non-European” aspects of their identity. Interestingly, there
was a sizeable group that did not support the law, not because they believed in women’s right to
wear the voile, but because they believed that refusing these girls from public schools would
serve to worsen their oppression. These individuals believed that welcoming scarved girls in
public schools would lead to a sort of Republican indoctrination that would grant them the
liberty necessary to remove their scarves. Education, they believed, would instill a sense of
individualism in Muslim girls that would enable them to remove the shackles of religion and
culture on their own. While this point of view is still rooted in sexism, it recalls the historical
function of public education as a tool for integrating children from all regions across the nation
into one national culture. It is helpful to recall this history, and consider its stability, in order to
contextualize the school’s new job of integrating French children from various religious
backgrounds.

Laïcité and the School: Removing the Veil from the Republican Sanctuary
Since the Third Republic made the secular school into a revered, quasi-sacred institution
of the Republic, it has retained its cultural currency, being called a “Republican sanctuary” by
President Chirac.118 French historian Yvan Gastaut uses strong words in declaring “it is by the
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school that the Republic began, it is at the school that it is taught, it is the school that illustrates
and promotes it.”119 Reiterated countless times in political speeches, governmental reports and
the like, this message has become a Republican truism. With such emphasis placed on the
secular school as the foundation of citizen-building and the instruction of Republican values,
anything that threatens the integrity of the school system is in effect a threat to the entire
Republic. This exact claim has been made in modern debates on the laïc nature of public schools,
including a 1989 petition against the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public schools, which
stated that “the Republic has the School as a foundation. This is why the destruction of the
School would precipitate that of the Republic.” 120 It emerges, then, that the private school is the
adversary of the secular school, and “the idea of the private [religious] school[…] ought to
trouble the Republican consciousness.”121 However, private schools are and have historically
been subsidized by the State.
The most common point of reference for this rapprochement between the State and
private schools is the Debré law of 1959, which offered private schools the opportunity to enter
into a contract with the State in order to receive federal funding. 122 Named after General de
Gaulle’s Prime Minister Michel Debré, this law aimed to put an end to the “guerre scolaire”
(educational war) between private and public education that came to a head after WWII due to
substantial population growth that overwhelmed the school system and the financial difficulties

Yvan Gastaut, “L’islam français est-il soluble dans la laïcité?,” L’Histoire 289 (July-August 2004): 96.
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par l’école que la république a commencé, c’est à l’école qu’elle est enseignée, c’est l’école qui l’illustre et la
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120 Elisabeth Badinter, Régis Debray, Alain Finkielkraut, Elisabeth de Fontenay, and Catherine Kintzler, “Profs, ne
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encountered by private schools, which were almost entirely Catholic. 123 The law granted these
establishments the right to maintain their “particular character” (caractère propre), or their
religious character, while stipulating that this education must be given “with full respect for
freedom of conscience. All children, without distinction of origin, opinions, or belief, will have
access to it.”124 This law was a concession to religious students and families, offering a Statesponsored option to receive religious education under a new system that, in theory, taught the
same curriculum as public schools. In an address to the National Assembly, Debré asserted that
private education, too, could be considered a public service, and that “we must judge this fact
with a modern spirit” because the State is no longer battling religion for political control as it
was at the end of the nineteenth century. 125 “It should be recognized, in this century, for our
generations,” he added, “that it is perfectly acceptable that a part of education should remain in
the hands of teachers who, by their religion, undoubtedly have a special character but who
nevertheless have the right to participate in the public service of national education.” 126
Despite the neutral wording of this law, in practice it undermined public education by
defending the right to elect to attend private schools, or to divide socially based on religious
belief. This practice can be seen as a manifestation of “communalism—” the French term used to
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designate societal divisions based on religion, ethnicity, or other particularistic characteristics.
According to Republican thought, “communalism” is problematic because it makes the nation
into a collection of various groups, thereby dismantling the vision of France as one unified
national community. In the context of education, Republicans denounce and seek to eliminate
communalism through the public school’s emphasis on oneness and integration. Since private
schools were and still are almost entirely Catholic (though a small number of Jewish schools
exist), this law served to bolster the Catholic education system, making France at once laïc and
imbued with Catholic influence that makes up the nation’s heritage. Government support for
religious education did not, however, extend to Islam as it rose to its current position as the
second largest religion in France, and there are today only a few Muslim schools in all of France.
This shows how the Debré law not only undermined the principle of laïcité, but also contributed
to the formation of a sort of Catholic-laïcité whereby Catholicism obtained a preferential stature
vis-à-vis other religions in France.
The powerful presence of conservative laïcité was visible once again in 1984 when
President Mitterrand proposed a law aimed at creating “a large, unified, and laïque public service
of national education” that would integrate private schools into the public school system. 127 The
proposition was met by massive demonstrations defending l’école libre which led to the
abandonment of the project.128 In this event we see a recoil of aggressive Republican
secularization, which champions the public school, and a victory of the conservative, Catholic
political Right. Private education remains prominent today with over 2 million children attending
State-supported Catholic schools, showing how the Catholic Church has maintained its cultural
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significance in French society. The strong and sustained presence of private Catholic education
suggests that some particularities are acceptable (Christianity) while others, such as Islam,
lacking the government resources awarded to Catholics, are not. This hypocrisy became apparent
as the voile affairs raised questions about laïcité in schools and the possibility of private Muslim
education.
Another example of the hegemonic and insidious nature of French Catholic-laïcité is the
maintenance of a school calendar that aligns with Catholic holidays. With such high importance
placed on the school as a neutral space of citizen-building, it is notable that public schools
continue to uphold Christian holidays, with no school on Saturdays and Sundays, winter break
falling on Christmas, spring break on Easter, etc. When the Stasi Commission proposed the
addition of a Jewish and a Muslim holiday to the school calendar, the suggestion was rejected by
President Chirac on the grounds that it would “encourage religious ‘communalism’ in otherwise
secular schools.”129 This shows how the French government has repeatedly upheld a double
standard between Catholicism and France’s other religions. Since Catholic holidays were part of
the school calendar since the advent of public education, to continue observing school breaks
during these holidays is deemed “neutral,” as this Catholic heritage is what French culture is
built upon. Recognizing other religious holidays, however, would threaten the very grounds upon
which public education stands by allowing religion to invade the sacred laïc space. This example
demonstrates how “laïcité has become a consensual representation of national identity” in France
that, I might add, is also linked with Catholicism.130 It follows that laïcité does not ensure as
rigid a separation between Church and State as Republicans claim. The question of the veil in
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schools resurfaced discussions on what laïcité means in the context of schools and how separate
religion must be from this public institution.
The Stasi Report reminds us: “The question of laïcité reappeared in 1989 there where it
was born in the nineteenth century: in the school.” 131 While the maintenance of Republican
social order was the reason for the debates on laïcité, the school was the location which sparked
the debates because of the historical significance of the school as the site of citizen formation.
Since the founding of the French public education system with the Ferry laws in the 1880s, the
school has been understood as a place of socialization which shapes children into informed
citizens capable of “living together” (vivre ensemble) across differences. As the Stasi Report
elaborates, the school’s mission “is essential in the Republic. It transmits knowledge, forms the
critical mind, assures autonomy, openness to cultural diversity[…] In this way it prepares the
citizens of tomorrow to live together within the Republic[…] The school is thus a fundamental
institution of the Republic…”132 With the school framed by Jules Ferry as “the crucible of
citizenship, the space of transition from private to public, from family and community to nation,”
students were seen as extremely fragile and impressionable. 133 This vulnerable stage was
simultaneously the ideal state for shaping Republican citizens and a condition that made them
vulnerable to social fragmentation if visible differences existed between them and their fellow
classmates. For this reason, the school became seen as a sort of sanctuary from the world, a
special haven of citizen formation where differences must be hidden. The Stasi Commission thus
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extrapolated that, “at school, the wearing of a conspicuous religious sign—large cross, kippa, or
veil—suffices already to disturb the tranquility of scholarly life.”134
It is important to note, however, that although the law technically applied to all
conspicuous religious signs, it was clearly targeted at the headscarf. As Scott points out, “nobody
until now had worried about Jewish boys wearing skullcaps or Sikhs wearing turbans. The law
was applied to them as a kind of afterthought,” thus reinforcing the historical importance placed
on female, not male, signs of religiosity. 135 As Scott comments, voile affairs therefore incited
French Republicans to flip Ferry’s pedagogy on its head. While Ferry defined the goal of the
school as “instill[ing] a common republican political identity in children from a diversity of
backgrounds,”136 the Stasi commission claimed that integration was “a prerequisite for
education, rather than its outcome” while still claiming respect for diversity. 137 The report stated:
“without being a sterile environment, the school cannot become an echo chamber of the passions
of the world, at the risk of failing at its educative mission”138 and “the school must not be a
shelter from the world, but students must be protected from the ‘fury of the world’: certainly, it is
not a sanctuary, but it must favor a distancing from the real world in order to permit learning.” 139
Though the commission claimed that the school was not a sanctuary, this claim
contradicts other political discourse on that nature of the school. For instance, Chirac elsewhere
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referred to the public school as a “Republican sanctuary,” revealing the bumpiness of the
commission’s argument as it tried not to sacralize the school. 140 If the school did not enforce
policies of uniformity and denial of difference—as it did before the passing of the law, when
students were free to wear headscarves in the classroom—the commission feared that identity
conflicts would undermine the school’s ability to form a cohesive student body, and hence
destabilize the social body at the national level. To the commission, the headscarf could not be
accepted as an expression of an individual’s right to freedom of conscience; it was viewed as a
radical symbol of proselytism that tarnished the neutral space of the school. 141
This thought process exemplifies the aforementioned position of the commission that
“[laïcité] supposes a dynamic intellectual attitude, opposite to the lazy posture of simple
neutrality.”142 Rather than operating on the basis of a neutrality where the State neither
encourages the presence of religious signs nor actively works to remove them, French secularism
is characteristic of what Ahmet Kuru terms “assertive secularism.” According to this model, the
State “actively excludes religion from public life.” 143 In the same vein as Baubérot, Kuru argues
that laïcité took on this assertive manifestation because of the way the French constitution points
to laïcité “as an official ideology and identity of the state” as opposed to a matter of individual
rights.144 While American secularism intends to protect the individual’s right to exercise his
religion freely, laïcité is framed as a policy that protects individuals from religion and tradition,
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and which “makes it possible to ensure a common life.” 145 According to Jean-Paul Willaime,
traditional laïcité in France is so dogmatic that is has almost become a religion. 146
The greatest irony of the 2004 law was that, despite its justification as a protection of the
secular school, it indirectly favored private schools. By banning headscarves in public schools,
the law encouraged scarf-wearing girls to seek private education, thus undermining the public
education system the law so wanted to reinforce. 147 Instead of forcing the assimilation of
“immigrants,” the law paradoxically drove them away from the public school—“the main
constitutive institution of laïcité.”148 This turn toward private schools increased social divisions
based on religious difference and “reinforce[d] the ‘communalist’ division of society that
Republicans denounce.”149 This demonstrates the stubbornness with which politicians clung to
history and failed to consider the possibility of any real structural change in the application or
definition of laïcité in response to the diversification of French society. Rather than increasing
respect for diversity, the law can be understood as a sort of self-indulgent defense of Republican
principles. If the Muslim girl would not make herself an abstract individual by coming to school
bare-headed, she was not ready or capable of joining French society.

Feminist Debates on the Voile
Public debates about the voile and the 2004 law often centered on the themes of feminism
and individualism. Anti-voile spokespeople from across the political spectrum (such as Elisabeth
Badinter, Fadela Amara, and Yvette Roudy) argued that the voile undermined women’s freedom
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and, as such, shows a lack of individual freedom and corresponding strong familial/cultural
pressures. A free woman liberated from these burdens, they argued, would never willingly
choose to wear the voile. On the other side, activists such as Françoise Gaspard and Saïda Kada
defended the liberty of conscience of women who wore the voile and shed light on the many
reasons why a woman might choose to wear it independent of outside pressures. These figures
also challenged the idea that feminism and the voile were necessarily mutually exclusive by
problematizing the dominant view that the “West” embodies ultimate freedom and modernity.
First, we will turn to those who denounced the voile. Following the release of the minister
of education, Lionel Jospin’s statement in response to the first voile affairs in 1989, a group of
intellectuals including Elisabeth Badinter released a petition titled “Profs, ne capitulons pas!”
(“Teachers, let us not give in!”) condemning the wearing of the voile in schools.150 The petition,
which took the form of a letter to Jospin, asserted that the voile tied students to their roots, thus
disturbing the quality of the classroom, whose tranquility was attributed to the abstraction of
students from their particularities. This rendered students not individuals capable of making their
own decisions, but agents of their parents and their religion, thus calling individualism into
question. They wrote: “Students must have the pleasure of forgetting their community of origin
and to think about something other than what they are in order to be able to think for
themselves.”151 The petition revealed the fear that social divisions would lead to a feedback loop
where these divisions in the school environment would reinforce social divisions in society at
large and Muslims would never remove their voile and thus never integrate into French society.
In their words, when the voile was allowed, “each student is constantly taken back to their
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parents, reminded of their condition, bound to their ‘roots:’ it is a school of social
predestination.”152
Like the two government reports, the petition also framed scarved girls as victims who
needed to be liberated, referencing “thousands of young [female] Muslims who are fighting here
and there for their dignity and their freedom.”153 While this referred to Muslims both in France
and abroad, it had the effect of overemphasizing the quantity of girls wearing the voile in
schools, which was estimated at under 1500 students.154 Tying together the arguments for the
loss of agency and individualism amongst women wearing the voile and concerns for women’s
rights, the petition stated: “Tolerating the Islamic headscarf is not welcoming a free being (in this
case a young girl)[…] Instead of offering this young girl a space of freedom, you signify to her
that there is no difference between the school and the house of her father. In allowing[…] the
Islamic headscarf, symbol of female submission, you give a carte blanche to fathers and brothers,
that is, to the harshest patriarchy on the planet.” 155 This claim linked the two halves of the
argument together, insisting on the intrinsically harmful nature of the voile, the religion it
stemmed from, and hence the unacceptability of its presence in France.
Another important anti-voile voice is that of Muslims in France such as Fadela Amara,
founder of the movement Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Submissive), a feminist
movement formed in 2002 aimed at fighting racism, sexism, and violence against women in
France’s suburbs, where many Muslims live. The movement’s intentionally provocative name is
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an acknowledgment of two stereotypes of Muslim/Arab women: one who does not wear the voile
and is considered a whore by the men in her community, and, on the opposite end, the one who,
submissively, wears the voile and resigns herself to a domestic life of caring for her father and
brothers.156 As the Stasi report said: “Young men impose on them [Muslim women] to wear
covering and asexual outfits, to lower their gaze at the sight of a man; if they fail to comply, they
are stigmatized as ‘whores.’”157 Amara aimed to shatter this idea of the woman as only
submissive or a whore by upholding laïcité and its corresponding values of gender equality and
mixité (the social mixing of men and women, considered an essential foundation of French
society). In an interview with NBC News, Amara said: “I consider, in the case of Muslim women,
Islam must adapt itself to modernity.”158 “You must consider, the veil, for me,” she continued,
“is not a religious symbol. It is a symbol of the submission of women in a patriarchal society[…]
The veil is what creates the separation of the sexes [the opposite of mixité] and draws the line
that separates equality of rights.”
The fact that some Muslim women such as Amara fought against the wearing of the
headscarf is worthy of considering more closely, as it suggests their embrace of the notion of the
Republic’s “civilizing mission” aimed at ridding immigrants of their archaic religion and culture.
In this case, the “civilizing mission” succeeds by convincing the French Arab woman that her
true liberty will be attained through assimilation. Amara and those who made up Ni Putes Ni
Soumises, many of whom had lived under Islamic regimes, believed in “the innate desire of
women for emancipation in Western terms[…and believed that] women would not choose the
Fadela Amara cited in Daniel Strieff, “For women in France’s ghettos, a third option,” NBC News, June 7, 2006,
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veil unless they were forced to.”159 These women supported the voile ban because “the Islamic
veil subjects all of us, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to an intolerable discrimination against
women.”160 Imbued in the discourse surrounding women’s rights in France, these women of nonFrench origin assumed feminist positions aligned with those of “native French” feminists.
Françoise Vergès, a prominent French political scientist and feminist problematizes traditional,
white French feminism in her book Un féminisme décolonial (A Decolonial Feminism). Vergès
explains how, according to this traditional feminism,
…the patriarchy is no longer a term associated with a global form of male
domination (and therefore also European); it is consubstantial with Islam. European
feminists envision themselves not only as the avant-garde of the movement for the
rights of women but also as their guarantors. They present themselves as the last
front to contain an assault that would come from the South [the Orient] and threaten
all women.161
Vergès’ characterization of French feminism shows how the old “civilizing mission” is still at
work now that Islam has become a major force in modern France. I would add to Vergès’
argument that the Muslim feminists who adopted the views of European feminists were in a
sense adopting a colonial attitude towards themselves and other “immigrant” women by
envisioning their emancipation in “Western” terms. They worked to show other French Muslims
that they, too, could be emancipated from the patriarchal traditions of their culture if they
renounced such non-European customs and assimilated to French culture.
Turning to those who defended women’s right to wear the voile, the idea of the irreparable
conflict between the modern, Western Republic and the archaic traditionalism of Islam arose once

Scott, The Politics of the Veil, 164.
Ibid.
161 Françoise Vergès, Un féminisme décolonial (Paris: La Fabrique éditions, 2019), 70. Original text: “Le patriarcat
n’est désormais plus un terme associé à une forme globale de domination masculine (donc aussi européenne); il est
consubstantiel à l’Islam. Les féministes européennes s’envisagent non seulement comme l’avant-garde du
mouvement pour les droits des femmes mais aussi comme leurs garantes. Elles se présentent comme la dernière
ligne de front pour contenir un assaut qui viendrait du Sud et menacerait toutes les femmes.”
159
160

58
again. Scott presents an example of the clashing of these two positions in a January 2004 television
debate between Saïda Kada and Elisabeth Badinter, a staunch Republican known for singling out
religion as a major force working against women’s rights and an author of the “Teachers, let us
not give in!” petition against headscarves in schools.162 Saïda Kada, the veiled Muslim founder of
Femmes françaises et musulmanes engageés (French Muslim Women in Action) defended the
voile on the grounds of its status as a religious (and thus personal), rather than political,
expression.163 Kada pointed out the neocolonialism that stood at the base of all arguments against
the voile. As Scott recounts:
Insisting that the headscarf was not antithetical to women’s freedom but in fact
represented an individual choice, Kada urged greater understanding of Islam: ‘I
think today two things are mixed up together [that ought to be separated]:
emancipation and Westernization.’ An agitated Badinter broke in: ‘Rightly so; they
are rightly connected to one another.’ In her comment there is a fascinating slippage
from ‘Westerization’ to the emancipatory values of republican France and from
there, tacitly, to modernity. For Badinter, ‘France’ is the highest embodiment of the
Western and the modern.164
This interaction demonstrates the extent to which Republican French feminists (those who
considered modernity, the West, and laïcité as the keys to women’s emancipation) believed that
they held the key to liberating women held back by Islam through their superior stature as
secular Europeans. Kada, however, problematized Badinter’s position (a position that was held
by many, even if expressed less explicitly) that was grounded in a neocolonial mentality. The
Stasi Report quite openly gave the Republic the role of “colonial savior,” stating that “the
Republic cannot remain deaf to the cry of distress of these young girls,” and thus responded with
a law banning the voile.165 This law was built upon the false equation of the West with
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emancipation that Kada criticized. The law framed those wearing the veil as resistant to
modernity and aimed to “Westernize” and “modernize” these women through forced
assimilation.
Kada challenged this tendency to assume the supremacy of all things “Western” and
French as well as the victimization of those who wore the voile, defending it as a symbol of
individual devotion rather than something imposed by external forces. Kada tied the two
arguments together in the televised debate with Badinter, stating that for her, the voile “signified
submission only to God, not to men[…] If some men had abused the teachings of the Koran in
order to ‘sacralize their domination’ of women, she argued, this was neither the only
interpretation of Islamic teaching nor an acceptable one.” 166 Public opinion about Islam was
founded on often ill-informed ideas that misrepresented the Muslim faith, and these ideas were
perpetuated and reinforced by prominent intellectuals, politicians, and activists who “focused on
only the most sexist and archaic interpretations of women’s position [in Islamic teaching…] and
presented those as the essential—the only—meaning of it.”167 While the Stasi report claimed that
the voile was a symbol that aligned with “the emergence of radical politico-religious
movements” in the Muslim world in the 1970s, such a claim ignores the multitude of personal
reasons why women may choose to wear the voile which have nothing to do with political
Islam.168 This debate shows us how French feminisms often relied on overly reductive
understandings of Islam that allowed French women to position themselves as liberators from the
gender inequality that they claimed was inherent to Islam.
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A study carried out by sociologists Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar in 19931994 (before the voile affairs even began), helped shed light on the fallacy of the voile as
something imposed rather than freely chosen by young women. As Bowen notes, the work of
Gaspard and Khosrokhavar consisted of interviewing Muslim women from a variety of
backgrounds in an attempt to understand the complex meanings of the voile as well as their
motives for wearing it. During the study, they failed to find any women with allegiances to
political Islamic groups; “to the contrary, all the girls and women emphasized their right to make
their own decisions.”169 Additionally, while study participants cited a variety of reasons for
choosing to wear the voile, Gaspard and Khosrokhavar found that “young women chose to adopt
Islamic dress, including the headscarf, as part of efforts to negotiate a sphere of social freedom
and authority and to construct an identity as a Muslim.”170 The relative weight of these two
factors depended on an individual’s age, education, country of origin, and socioeconomic status,
making each woman’s situation unique. The veil was thus arguably a means of self-affirmation
for the majority of those who wore it, but “here too, we observe a diversity of cases, irreducible
to a single identity,” as it was so often portrayed by politicians as a unified “Muslim entity.” 171
Further debunking the idea of a singular type of submissive Muslim girl tied to the religious
tradition of her parents and her “cultural roots” was Khosrokhavar’s finding that “the girls who
wear the veil don’t belong to the most traditional groups, except for some of them of Turkish or
Moroccan origin. Often, in fact, girls wear the veil while their mother had formerly removed
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it.”172 The opposite of constantly taking students back to their parents, reminding them of their
condition, and binding them to their “roots,” as the Stasi report argued, the voile was more often
an instrument that separated the girl from her parents and led to “an assertion of […her] self in
her own right [separate from the family].”173 Those who claimed that a law banning the veil
would liberate women from Muslim machismo thus relied on a flawed and essentially racist
argument that underestimated Muslim women’s agency and reinforced colonial attitudes.

Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that the era from 1989 to 2004 witnessed a new invocation
of laïcité against the veil, a symbol of Islam in France. Gender equality was, for the first time,
articulated as an inextricable tenet of laïcité in the Stasi Report, paving the way for Republican
critiques of the veil as a symbol of Islam’s oppression of women. More than a religious symbol,
the veil was positioned in inherent conflict with “enduring” French values, leaving no space for
such an unacceptable garment in the Republican sanctuary of the school. The 2004 law forced
veil-wearing students to seek private education, thus depriving the public school the opportunity
to “free” these girls from their subjugation. A belief in the Republic’s duty to liberate the former
colonial subject through indoctrination in French culture is evident in feminist discourse of this
time, showing how even arguments for voile bans supposedly based on gender equality were in
actuality rooted in racism and a sense of Western superiority.
In Chapter 3 I consider an alternative approach to the “Islam problem” that was carried
out by Chirac’s Minister of the Interior and presidential successor Nicolas Sarkozy: “laïcité
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positive.” Distinguishing itself from hardline approaches to Islam, such as the 2004 law, laïcité
positive attempted to reshape the government’s stance towards religion and Islam given the
drastic reshaping of French society over the course of the past few decades. To this end, Sarkozy
increased government interaction with Muslim communities by forming a national-level French
Council for the Muslim Faith and encouraged the development of a new French attitude towards
laïcité that respects and celebrates the nation’s multiculturalism. Below the surface, however, I
will demonstrate how Sarkozy’s actions actually served to reinforce racism and Islamophobia.
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Chapter 3
Sarkozy’s “Laïcité positive” and the Securitization of Islam under the Guise of Inclusion

In the same year that Chirac established the Stasi Commission, his Minister of the
Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy took a different approach to the “Muslim question” by creating a
representative body of Muslim leaders in France. Appointed in 2002, Sarkozy took active
measures to address the issue of Muslim integration into French society during his first two-year
term. Many lauded Sarkozy’s efforts, particularly his creation of a central body of Muslim
leaders, the French Council of the Muslim Faith, or Conseil français du culte musulman
(CFCM). However, as I argue, Sarkozy’s efforts were dominated by security concerns due to
increasing fears of radical and political Islam that had become a central topic in an increasingly
right-leaning France. Moreover, I show that these concerns were cloaked in a political
philosophy that emphasizes national unity through the abstraction of each individual from
religious, ethnic, and other identities, a value that functions through sameness achieved through
cultural assimilation.174 Since the first voile affair rendered Islam a central topic of political
discussion in 1989, Islam was increasingly viewed as a security threat, a view augmented by
Chirac’s inflammatory and blatantly intolerant statements throughout his political career, both
before and after the headscarf affairs addressed in Chapter 2. Sarkozy was often portrayed as a
counterweight to Chirac’s unwavering commitment to a conservative interpretation of laïcité.
Sarkozy’s took a more nuanced stance towards laïcité, which he laid out in the conception of a
new approach that he termed laïcité positive. His 2004 book, The Republic, Religions, and Hope
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(La République, les religions, l’espérance), outlines his proposition of a new more open version
of laïcité that allows individuals of all confessions [la religion] to live their faith or hope
[l’espérance] peacefully while taking part in civil society [la République]. Rather than rejecting
all governmental interaction with and acknowledgment of religious communities, laïcité positive
recognized the important role of religion in shaping French citizens, history, and culture, thus
allowing faith to become an appropriate topic in public discourse and government engagement.
In what follows, I analyze how Sarkozy’s actions and discourse during his first term as
Minister of the Interior contributed to the reproduction and intensification of racism and social
inequality, thereby rendering Muslim integration into French society more difficult. First, I
consider his role and motives in the formation of the CFCM in 2003, the most visible
manifestation of his engagement of French Muslims. I then consider the theoretical suppositions
that undergirded Sarkozy’s actions and discourse, namely communalism and universalism.
Finally, I argue that Sarkozy’s sustained emphasis on the importance of France’s Christian roots,
which he considered central to French national identity, prompted the emergence of an
increasingly antagonistic laïcité that arose as a neocolonial and nationalist response to the
presence of those of non-European origin in France, all while grounding French identity in a sort
of Catholic-laïcité. Essentially, I argue that Sarkozy framed his new laïcité positive as a way for
France to adapt its understanding of laïcité given the context of a now multicultural and
increasingly diverse nation. However, the way he goes about implementing laïcité positive as
Minister of the Interior demonstrates that his primary concern was to gain control over the
manifestation of Islam in France and to urge French Muslims to assimilate.
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French Council of the Muslim Faith: The Embodiment of Laïcité Positive?
As Minister of the Interior, Sarkozy took to heart the part of this position that made him
also the ministre des Cultes, or minister of religions, and resolved to take an active stance in this
portion of his duties as Minister of the Interior. Through his engagement with the religious
domain, Sarkozy affronted a social taboo in French society. Previous ministers often neglected
the role of ministre des Cultes due to their belief that the principle of laïcité prevented or at least
discouraged their active engagement with religious peoples. On the other hand, Sarkozy argued
that involving religious peoples in government discussions was crucial to maintaining national
stability, hence proving itself of central relevance to the duties of his ministerial post. He justifies
his active stance in his book, saying that his advancement of “...a long-term policy enabling the
French to be reconciled with their model of society based on collective adherence to a few
essential values [laïcité and universalism] and respect for differences, has been added to the
function of Minister of Religious Affairs, traditionally entrusted to the Minister of the Interior, to
make religious issues one of the important aspects of my activity.”175
Many staunch Republicans from both the Left and the Right, however, criticized what
they saw as governmental overstepping of the central Republican value of laïcité in Sarkozy’s
increased attention to this area. For instance, Sarkozy’s advocacy of the French equivalent of
affirmative action, or “positive discrimination,” pushed a policy by which the State would aid in
areas such as mosque construction and giving additional grants to schools in poorer areas with
higher Muslim populations.176 Jean-Marc Ayrault, president of the Socialist Party (Parti
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socialiste) deputies in the National Assembly, attacked Sarkozy’s positions, claiming that he was
forming a sort of “new ‘Concordat’” and that his ideas risked spurring on communalism
(communautarisme) among Muslims, an idea which I will return to later in this chapter. 177 But
what was the CFCM and what were Sarkozy’s motivations in creating it?
Most concretely, the CFCM was created under the premise of serving as a national body
to advise the government regarding policy decisions, but it was explicitly not intended to
“represent Muslims” as a community, as such as purpose would represent “communalism” which
is in direct opposition to Republican values.178 Notably, France’s other major religious groups
had national-level organizations such as the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of France, Protestant
Federation of France, and the Jewish Central Consistory; the CFCM intended to add a similar
Muslim group to this scene. In The Republic, Religions, and Hope, Sarkozy maintains that the
creation of the CFCM “was necessary for the future of our country, for the revival of our system
of integration which today is broken, to put an end to communalist drifting which feeds on the
sentiment of injustice.”179 On a practical level, the CFCM would deal with chaplaincy, Muslim
cemetery plot disputes, organizing Mecca pilgrimages, training imams, and organizing the
animal sacrifice on the Feast of Sacrifice, among other tasks.180 On a broader level, the CFCM
was intended to make Muslim voices heard in government with the hope of pacifying feelings of
exclusion which Sarkozy argued would lead to Muslim communalism, or self-isolation from the
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larger French populous, a phenomenon that Sarkozy believed would increase radicalization,
hence becoming a national security threat.
CFCM membership was drawn from three major preexisting Muslim groups in France:
the Grand Mosque of Paris (La Grande mosquée de Paris), the National Federation of French
Muslims (Fédération nationale des musulmans de France, FNMF), and the Union of French
Islamic Organizations (Union des organisations islamiques de France, UOIF). While most
CFCM members were elected by French Muslims around the country, a minority was appointed
by the Organization Commission (Commission organisation, COMOR) which led the formation
of the CFCM, including the CFCM president and the two vice presidents. 181 The president, Dalil
Boubakeur, also president of the Grand Mosque of Paris, was selected because of his ties to the
French-Algerian Muslim community, which was seen as the most moderate form of Islam in
France. As President of the Grand Mosque of Paris, a monument built and supported by the
government, Boubakeur was an easy choice for CFCM president because he was already serving
as a sort of intermediary between Islam in France and the French government. The two vice
presidents, on the other hand, came from the other two dominant Muslim organizations:
Mohamed Bechari from the Moroccan National Federation of French Muslims and Fouad Alaoui
from Union of French Islamic Organizations, which has links with the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood and is partly funded by Saudi Arabia. 182 From the French Republican perspective,
both the FNMF and UOIF were viewed as advocating a more extreme version of Islam,
especially the UOIF, which rose to prominence during the first voile affair in which it defended
the scarved schoolgirls. 183 In a nation-wide election that solicited the votes of France’s Muslims,
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the latter two groups received the most votes while the remaining CFCM positions, about
twenty-five percent, were filled by those whom the government deemed “qualified persons;”
namely, those who maintained a more moderate stature and lacked ties to foreign
governments.184 In fact, CFCM president Boubakeur even supported the 2004 law which banned
the wearing of the voile in public schools!185 Making the Republican argument that allowing the
veil in public school would spur on communalism, Boubakeur has been quoted saying: "I am not
in favor of multiculturalism[…] there is only one culture: French culture."186 Given his complete
embrace of Republican values it is no surprise that the French government judged Boubakeur to
be an ideal leader for the CFCM. However, this search for leadership was paradoxical—all those
who were willing to be co-opted by the State by becoming members of the CFCM were also the
least legitimate in the eyes of French Muslims. That is, these Muslim figures already shared the
views of the government, at least to some extent, and were complicit with the government’s strict
understanding of laïcité, and thus were not truly representative of the majority of the French
Muslim population. This trend was also reflected in the voting patterns for the CFCM election,
where the majority of elected members came from the FNMF and the UOIF, but the majority of
appointed members were more “moderate figures,” such as those associated with the Grand
Mosque of Paris.187 In 2003, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin even ordered the CFCM “to
serve as ‘the enlightened word of French Islam to fight against deviant tendencies which could
threaten our [French] social cohesion.’”188 From this dictate we can start to see how, while the
creation of the CFCM was an unprecedented step towards including Muslim voices in policy
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discussions, and may have had some positive effects simply by virtue of acknowledging the
existence of Muslims in France, it was essentially a measure taken with the intent of regulating
Islam and pressing Muslim integration and acceptance of French Republican values.
In his speeches and public statements, Sarkozy repeatedly emphasized the importance of
developing an understanding of Islam as compatible with French values if the “problem” of
Muslim integration was to be solved. Indeed Islam’s presence in France was understood above
all in terms of being a problem, framed as “the new state of diversity” or “the new challenge.” 189
In a 2002 speech addressing “Internal Security and Local Freedoms” at a COMOR meeting,
Sarkozy celebrated the progress made towards building what he called “a French Islam and not
Islam in France.”190 Furthermore, in linking Islam with questions of national security, Sarkozy,
like President Chirac and Prime Minister Raffarin, framed Islam not only as a problem, but a
threat to French society, thus adding fuel to anti-Muslim sentiments in France. Due to fears of
foreign Islamic powers dominating Muslim life in France, Sarkozy aimed to seize control of
Islam in France by taking deliberate action to eliminate the flow of foreign aid for mosque
construction as well as seeking to limit the number of foreign imams admitted to France, as
estimations revealed that about 90% of all imams in France were foreign nationals. 191
Additionally, the composition of French Muslims is replete with foreign influence with nearly all
of France’s estimated 4.5 million Muslims being either immigrants or the children of
immigrants, about half of whom hold foreign citizenship.192
In the eyes of the French government, the “problem” of Islam then became one of
identity. The government judged it necessary to inculcate “French values” among these
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communities in order to maintain a sense of social homogeneity in the midst of an increasingly
heterogeneous national demographic. Furthermore, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.’s
“War on Terror” spurred on French Republican concerns of Islamic extremism and Muslim
integration. As the children of Muslim immigrants increasingly proclaimed Islam as central to
their identity, French authorities took it upon themselves to change such attitudes by creating an
insulated form of moderate “French” Islam that was congruent with their understanding of
Western values.193 Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin—Raffarin’s successor—noted the
global rise of religion as an identity marker for individuals and communities, explaining this
trend as a reaction to globalization. In the face of cultural, political, and social homogenization,
he said, religion offered “a more authentic and meaningful identity.”194 What Villepin feared,
however, was that association with a religious identity over a French national identity
circumvented social homogenization and constituted a fundamental departure from French
values.
Scholars have been quick to underscore the neocolonial and discriminatory dimensions of
the CFCM’s creation. Given this context, Alejandro Caeiro explains that the CFCM can be
understood as a neocolonial approach to Islam whereby the government collated “securitizing
actors” with the goal of formulating what one scholar explained as Sarkozy’s hope for a “‘good
Islam’ in France” which disseminates a “liberal doxa” and marginalizes “radical elements.” 195
“Radical elements” or “fundamentalism” as invoked by Sarkozy and other political actors is
defined as a loyalty to Islam over one’s loyalty to the Republic, or refusing to “reconcile their
convictions with the limits of political obligation.” 196 Such a formulation runs contrary to
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laïcité’s guarantee of freedom of conscience, though as Baubérot points out, “We must dispose
of the fiction that ‘republican laicity’ established equality among religions.” 197 Rather, laïcité has
frequently been invoked in defense of governmental actions that limit the autonomy of
individuals and communities (specifically religious minorities) and regulate religious practices.
Laïcité’s division of the public and private sphere was developed in the context of a majorityChristian nation. Other religions that are more entwined with ethnic communities, such as
Judaism and Islam, are perceived as threatening this public-private divide, which leads the
government to limit their religious expression in France’s laïque society. In order to understand
why the government deemed it necessary to take rights away from religious communities that
were present in public space we must take a step back and consider why religious communities
present such a challenge to Republican universalism.

Communalism vs. Universalism: Securing Republicanism by Removing Particularisms
Though my thesis deals primarily with Islam in France, it is important to note the
experience of French Jews in order to portray the historical presence of other non-Christian
religions in France. It is also useful for drawing connections to the Muslim experience about the
grounds on which both groups were persecuted. During the French Revolution, anti-Jewish
sentiments manifested in the debates that surrounded the enfranchisement of French Jews in
1791. Due to antisemitism’s racialization of Jews, Jews were seen as an “other,” “a community
apart, a nation within a nation.”198 It was ultimately determined that Jews earned citizenship not
as members of their religious community, but as individuals abstracted from this feature of their
identity. In the century that followed, many Jews assimilated to French culture, yet anti-Semitic
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undercurrents remained, revealing that the Revolutionary promise of universalism was not fully
actualized. As the 1880s brought larger numbers of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe,
heightened tensions led to the Dreyfus affair: a political scandal in which an innocent Jewish
army captain was accused of espionage and finally exonerated in 1906. 199 The Dreyfus affair
generated nationalist, anti-Semitic feelings among those who viewed Dreyfus, a symbol for all
Jews, as “an enemy within,” generating an image of “the Jew as a representative of a foreign
nation.”200 Needless to say, the Vichy Regime that reigned in German-occupied WWII France
also advanced extremely anti-Semitic politics by contributing to the Holocaust. In the aftermath
of these atrocities, France’s admission of fault has led to a decline in anti-Semitism and a belief
that the full integration of Jews is possible, despite the pre-WWII insistence that Jews’
communalism prevented them from becoming fully “French.”201 Just as this integration was not
deemed possible in the years before and during WWII, today many argue that Muslims’ strong
ethno-religious identities preclude their integration into French society. Similarly, historical
racism against Jews has today shifted into racism primarily directed towards Muslims. The story
of French anti-Semitism evidently draws many parallels to the experience of Muslims today,
who, regardless of where they were born or how they identify themselves, are also seen by the
nationalistic French as members of foreign nations who, through their presence in France,
threaten the unity of French society.
Growing numbers of Muslim-identifying French residents and citizens generated fears of
communautarisme, a term I will translate as “communalism” in keeping with the majority of
scholars who write on this topic, though it may be alternatively translated as
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“communitarianism,” which expresses one’s responsibility to their community, whereas
“communalism” expresses a commitment specifically to one’s ethnic group. The concept of
communalism is rather obscure in the American imagination. While there has certainly been fear,
racism, and distaste towards various religious and/or ethnic groups throughout American history,
such fears are usually not expressed in terms of a fear of communalism, as they generally are in
France. There, charges of communalism generally target Muslims, Arabs, and North Africans.
Republican critiques of communalism perceive such groups as a threat to the French Republican
project of universalism, in that affiliating with religious and ethnic groups pushes an individual
into un repli communautaire, literally “a withdrawal into one’s own community.” Rather than
accepting the politics of integration, the communalist maintains their ethnic identity over their
identity as a French citizen. 202 Closely tied with French political philosophy and Republicanism,
laïcité stands as an “emblem of specific French identity” whereby commitment to laïcité
outweighs individual religious affinities. 203 As the newest major religion to arrive in France,
Islam was not present during the period in which laïcité developed as this central French value,
whereas Christianity and Judaism were present during this shift. Therefore as soon as one is
identified as Muslim, they are assumed to lack this cultural and historic background through
which one may at once uphold laïcité and exercise their religious beliefs in private.
With this as a base, Muslims (as well as members of any other group) merit citizenship
only as individuals abstracted from all of their external associations, including and especially
their religious communities. However, Muslims were seen as incapable of abstraction from their
religious communities, rendering them incapable of assimilating or becoming fully “French,”
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even if they manage to attain the legal status of citizen.204 The voile, for instance, was seen as an
insistence on one’s difference, a challenge to the notion of a homogeneous citizenry that
undergirds the French understanding of “a nation one and indivisible.” 205 By displaying one’s
identity so conspicuously, political figures argued that these veiled women distorted the vision of
a unified populous, presenting themselves first and foremost as members of a community,
implicitly positing that their Muslim identity was more important than their French, or national
identity. This threatened the very fabric of French society by suggesting that identities were in
fact fragmented, and there did not exist one insular French identity to which all citizens
subscribed. To wear the veil was a profound violation of the social contract, a statement that one
was resistant to French values and Western culture, preferring to remain within the values held
by their religious and ethnic communities.
This question of Muslim communalism emerged as a major topic of debate in the
political landscape of the early 2000s. In the face of increasing evidence of a no longer
homogeneous society, Republican politicians reacted with a “defensive insistence” on preserving
that lost homogeneity.206 In this way, the government maintained a semblance of national unity
by refusing to recognize difference, a standpoint they claimed exemplified neutrality. This
position marked the political discourse of President Chirac. For the sake of guaranteeing that
social differences do not fracture national unity, he insisted on strict adherence to the 1905 law;
the result, however, was the denial of the existence of differences altogether. 207 Taking a
different route than most other politicians, Sarkozy, however, acknowledged the new state of
cultural diversity in France, arguing in The Republic, Religions, and Hope that these differences
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amongst citizens must not be ignored, for such an approach merely exacerbates strong
preexisting tensions. He writes:
In reality, and it’s here which lies the entire problem, France has become
multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious[…] We must integrate [the Muslim
population], that is to say to accept their specificities which enrich the republican
crucible. Integration is not assimilation, the latter imposing on the last arrived that
he renounce his identity in order to be accepted. To say “the Muslims of France”
[…] [is] to give a name to a part of French society whose integration we must
organize in order to avoid succumbing to their withdrawal, a communalist
temptation which is sadly already very present. 208
Sarkozy’s more nuanced approach towards dealing with multicultural France recognizes the
antagonistic nature of Chirac’s rhetoric which denies the legitimacy of community ties,
explaining how this approach can lead only to a communal withdrawal of Muslims from the
public sphere. While Sarkozy posits an important counter-voice to Chirac, it is notable that his
engagement of Muslim communities remains justified insofar as such engagement pertains to
national security and the maintenance of order rather than a moral imperative to upholding
religious liberty. Sarkozy’s fear of communalism is evident in his insistence on Muslim
representation as a means of deterring them from withdrawing from society and developing
extremist views. The CFCM’s first and foremost purpose, he stated, was to represent the Muslim
faith in order to “appease” Muslims by “making their voices heard.”209
In articulating the meaning of the CFCM, Sarkozy had to do some philosophical and
semantic gymnastics: it represented the Muslim faith, but not Muslims as a group or entity—that
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would be communalism. The CFCM amassed Muslims into a council, but not as representatives
of Muslim communities. Yet, Sarkozy expressed his aim of “ameliorating the daily reality of
France’s believing Muslims,” which, though not articulated as such, essentially entailed a series
of social measures that targeted a specific sub-set of French citizens and residents, addressing
such topics as education, housing inequality, employment inequality, etc. 210 These problems
were due to racism, sexism, the conflation of Islam and extremism, and the notion that those of
non-European origin came from a culture so different that they were not predisposed to
assimilation. More generally, Muslims, Arabs, and those of non-French heritage were classified
as “other,” thus pitting them against the “us” that was France’s idea of its historical
homogeneity. Though initially developed during the French Revolution, this French identity of
“oneness” with the nation was reiterated and further developed by distinguishing it from what it
is not, a process that Edward Said’s Orientalism describes as emerging through French colonial
history.
The Orient, or the metaphorical “East,” proves essential to understanding the
development of modern French identity, as it is in the French encountering of such foreign and
non-European cultures that a French identity was articulated and reaffirmed. In the words of
Denys Hay, “orientalism is never far from…the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying
‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans [emphasis mine].”211 In the context of
orientalism, Islam was always the mythological “Other.” When Islam made its way into France,
it arrived with this designation that linked all Muslims with a vague but deeply entrenched
“foreignness,” a foreignness that, in the French imagination, rendered these individuals incapable
of integration and out of line with French national identity. Deeply embedded in the abstract
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“other,” a Muslim could thus never be French unless he or she relinquished their ties to Islam.
Recalling the period of French colonialism in Algeria, French citizenship was available to
Algerians only upon the renunciation of their Islamic status.212
While the neocolonial governmental approach towards Muslims on French soil may not
be as explicitly anti-Islam as the former policy in Algeria, a colonial mentality has certainly
informed France’s present actions and attitudes towards Muslims. In fact, Islam became so
widely understood as the antithesis of “Europeanness” that newer Eastern European members of
the EU, such as Bulgaria—a country with a significant Muslim minority—have considered
headscarf bans similar to France’s 2004 law in order to be viewed as “acceptable Europeans.” 213
In 2016, Bulgaria followed through on these long-standing debates when the Parliament passed a
ban on face-covering garments in “government offices, schools and cultural institutions.” 214 This
example, modeled after many similar laws in other European countries such as France and
Turkey (itself modeled after France), shows how the Muslim headscarf has become a symbol of
“non-Westernness,” the embodiment of difference that precludes Muslim integration in
European societies.

Negotiating Universalism, Multiculturalism, and French Heritage: Integration or
Assimilation?
Whereas prior to 1970 many men came to work in France in order to take money back to
their families in their home countries, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a diversification of the
residency and citizenry of France as entire immigrant families began immigrating to and settling
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in France. These communities often faced discrimination in housing, work, and overall social
opportunity. Despite these challenges, the French government largely refrained from taking
action to aid immigrant groups, as such actions would recognize them as a community or subgroup within the nation. Actions to help immigrants would not only constitute governmentsanctioned communalism, but also violate the Republican ideal of the abstract citizen who
identifies with the Nation above any communal ties. The State thus maintained a stance of socalled neutrality by which it refused to recognize difference, even though in doing so it often
exacerbated social inequalities. This State-sponsored neutrality was mobilized expressly in
defense of the French model of Republican citizenship in contrast to multiculturalism, which
“officially recognized cultural differences and undermined the foundations of republican
citizenship: liberty, laicity, equality, fraternity (implying transcendence of particularism in the
name of the common interest).”215 In this case, by denying claims of group identities and
resisting a discourse of multiculturalism, the continued aspiration of maintaining a homogeneous
national population that embodies universalism began to operate at the expense of diversity. 216
Bertrand Guillaume brutally points out that the position “which makes a principle out of ignoring
the existence of groups…can easily be transformed into an ideology of the general interest whose
principal function is to hide the fact that the republican State serves the interests of dominant
groups.”217 In this context, the Republican ideal of universalism is clung to as the defining
characteristic of France, though its function and applicability has changed according to the
historical context. Instead of fostering equality, universalism today “looks more and more like a
form of European ethnocentrism, and thus like a form of domination rather than an invitation to
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liberation.”218 It is thus essential to distinguish universalism as an ideal from universalism in
practice, as the refusal to recognize difference does not prevent discrimination and community
divisions, but actually intensifies them. Abstract philosophical discourse on the nature of the
citizen as a decontextualized being thus loses its utility in the face of real-life inequalities that
demonstrate the fallacy of universalism, which, despite obstinate Republican support, does not
hold a mythical position outside of the constraints of time and place. A French model of
integration that is rooted in the universalist ideal is thus inherently flawed. As Dominique
Schnapper argues, the idea of “transcendence through citizenship appears to a humiliated people
[immigrants and their descendants who have been systematically excluded from French society]
as something purely formal that has the function of consecrating the domination of the other
under the guise of universality.”219 This integration model is Euro-centric and hegemonic,
involving an imposition of a historically-understood “French” identity that necessarily separates
those of non-European origin from their other ethnic, national, and religious affiliations.
Throughout his term as Minister of the Interior and during his 2007 presidential
campaign’s emphasis on French national identity, Sarkozy’s discourse surrounding religion and
laïcité repeatedly drew on the ideas of universalism (despite France’s multicultural status which
Sarkozy himself recognized) and the importance of French Catholic heritage in shaping this
universal national identity. Sarkozy recognized the dangers of turning a blind eye to cultural
differences, acknowledging that “by erasing specificities, by denying differences, we encourage
them. Those who claim to fight communalism do not realize that, often, they make it take
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root.”220 However, rather than accepting that the long-held Republican value of universalism was
no longer applicable in a multicultural nation, Sarkozy often insisted on policies that can be read
as assimilationist rather than integrationist, seeking to modify and regulate religious practice by
establishing “a pacified, modern, and open Islam developing in harmony with the art of living in
the French Republic.”221 For example, in his book La République, les religions, l’espérance,
Sarkozy recalls a televised discussion he participated in, boasting that he had “the opportunity to
say frankly to a veiled women: ‘When I enter a mosque, I remove my shoes. When you enter a
school, remove your veil,’” remarking, “This is what French Islam should be.” 222 In this rather
bald declaration, Sarkozy makes an incommensurate comparison between shoes and
headscarves. By suggesting that removing one’s veil in public is an act no more difficult than
removing one’s shoes, he fails to acknowledge the veil’s importance as an individual’s
expression of their religious identity. In saying this, Sarkozy fails to show true respect for
multiculturalism and instead insists that Muslims adapt to the French way by attending school
bare-headed.
Recognizing that French laïcité frequently assumed a hostile position towards Islam,
UOIF President Fouad Alaoui declared that “Just as Islam is asked to change, laïcité must
change.”223 In response to Alaoui’s argument, Sarkozy posited that while the essential principles
of laïcité must remain unchanged, a change was in order by which the French government must
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assume what he called a more active stance towards laïcité as opposed to its historically passive
position.224 He proceeded rather tactlessly to insist that Alaoui must denounce “laïque
fundamentalism and Muslim fundamentalism” with an equal intensity in order to make a valid
claim.225 This stance is problematic in that it fails to recognize Alaoui’s point of view. Coming
from a culture that (as Sarkozy himself recognizes) largely lacks representation and acceptance
in France, to demand that Alaoui champion the rejection of both fundamentalisms is to miss the
point. In saying this, Sarkozy demonstrated a desire first and foremost to instill a laïque identity
in Muslims rather than a genuine desire to address Muslim concerns. In other words, Sarkozy
only reached his hand out to the Muslim community as a function of their willingness to adopt
secular French values. As a Muslim, Alaoui was speaking for his own experience and that of his
community in defense of their rights. While Sarkozy may have been right that all
fundamentalisms should be cast aside, the argument was misplaced in this context, serving to
further antagonize Muslims seeking to enter the national dialogue on laïcité and integration in
order to secure their place in French society.
Sarkozy further antagonized French Muslims through his repeated emphasis on the
Christian heritage of France and its important role in the formation of modern French identity. In
a 2007, Sarkozy was given the title of Honorary Canon of the Basilica of Saint John Lateran in
Rome, a title held by many French heads of State since Henry IV in the sixteenth century. 226 In a
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speech accepting this honor at the Lateranense Palace in Rome, Sarkozy essentially declares that
France’s Christian roots run deeper than laïcité:
Laïcité cannot be a negation of the past. Laïcité does not have the power to cut
France from its Christian roots[…] I consider that a nation which ignores the
ethical, spiritual, and religious heritage of its history commits a crime against its
culture, against this mixture of history, heritage, art, and popular traditions, which
permeate so deeply our way of life and our thinking. To pull out the root is to lose
its significance, it is to weaken the cement of national identity, it is to further dry
out social relationships which are so desperately in need of symbols of memory.
This is why we must hold together the two ends of the chain : accept the Christian
roots of France, and even valorize them, all while defending laïcité…227
In this speech Sarkozy typifies the Catholic-laïcité that undergirds what is usually heralded by
Republicans simply as laïcité in a rather overt manner. By declaring that France’s Christian roots
must be honored despite the principle of laïcité, he implicitly makes the opposite statement that
Islamic heritage does not need to be preserved because it is only a part of France’s recent history
and does not have the same weight in forming the national consciousness, it is not a “symbol of
memory.” Through this implicit claim Sarkozy reveals his belief that Christian values form a
central piece of French identity and that Muslims must assimilate not only to a secular society,
but to a society that is imbued with Christian heritage. Murat Akan argues that in this speech
Sarkozy “did everything but explicitly say, ‘I am the Catholic president of a Catholic nation,’
although he conveyed as much.”228 From this excerpt of his speech, we can see how Sarkozy
capitalizes on the ambiguity of the concept of laïcité, which, never being strictly defined by the
constitution or French government, allows for a variety of interpretations and invocations
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depending on the social and political context and the aim of the speaker.229 In this instance,
Sarkozy exploits laïcité for two ends: to reassert the Christian dimension at the core of French
identity and to impose an identity on the “new French” (the descendants of immigrants) that is
steeped in Christian values.230 In this way, though Sarkozy claims to advocate integration over
assimilation, his true position is one of assimilation by which “foreigners” must demonstrate
their secularism by submitting to a set of State-sponsored values that valorize France’s Christian
roots, hence forming a “French Islam” rather than “Islam in France.” As Baubérot argues,
Sarkozy’s argument that laïcité positive permits the valorization of France’s historic Christianity
signifies the putting back, “under the cover of patrimonialization, a certain religious dimension
in French political identity.”231
In her chapter on “Citizenship,” Cécile Laborde points out how Sarkozy’s “tendency to
treat the national past as a ‘heritage,’ in the defense of the ‘French exception’ against intrusive
‘foreign models’” is merely a cover-up for the way in which Sarkozy attempted to re-center
Republican citizenship “on a vision of society more communalist than universality, and
associated with particular histories, memories, traditions, and locations.”232 In defining French
identity, Sarkozy thus delineated what counted as “French” and what did not, a division that
heavily favored those of historic French descent and required all “foreigners” to prove that they
had become laïc and embraced French values in order to be considered truly French. Despite
claiming that immigrants did not have to relinquish any part of their identity in order to be
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accepted, Sarkozy advanced a laïcité centered on French Catholic heritage which clearly
delineated an us-them opposition between the “old French” and the “new French.”
This French Catholic-laïcité that privileged Christian heritage is exemplified by the
approximately forty-five thousand Catholic churches which, due to the 1905 law, are presently
maintained by the State.233 Michel Troper argues that this situation is highly revealing of the
ambiguities of laïcité, as the 1905 law that set the rules regarding the separation of Church and
State was drafted in light of the contemporary religions of France: Catholicism, Protestantism,
and Judaism.234 While these religions benefited from receiving places of worship that are public
property and therefore paid for by the State, Muslims, arriving in France after 1905, found
themselves in the situation of needing to construct and maintain mosques without any of the
governmental assistance that France’s other religions had received. The 1905 law thus inherently
favored Catholicism, upholding its presence as a tenet of French patrimoine, or heritage, while
failing to support Islam, which quickly emerged as the nation’s second largest religious group. In
light of the emergence of a new religious group after 1905, the principle of secularism could be
interpreted in two ways: “either as requiring the state to treat all religions equally, and therefore
to provide Muslims with aid for the construction of mosques, or, on the contrary, as a general
obligation of abstention on the part of the state.” 235 France chose the latter option, which it
defended on the grounds of State neutrality and non-recognition of difference. Out of necessity,
French Muslims then largely turned to foreign donors for funds to construct mosques, with many
imams and religious leaders coming from overseas as well. In turn, many French politicians
viewed this phenomenon as a communalist threat that endangered national unity, which
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ultimately led to governmental movements such as Sarkozy’s creation of the CFCM that
attempted to rebrand Islam as French, not because the government wished to grant Islam the
same accommodations as France’s other major religions, but because it was seen as central to
national security.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to draw our attention back to a quote from Sarkozy himself on
the importance of dealing with the “Islam problem” in an appropriate and sufficient manner. In
his book, Sarkozy warns that “those who claim to fight communalism do not realize that, often,
they make it take root.”236 As I argued in this chapter, Sarkozy’s attempt to fight Muslim, Arab,
and “immigrant” communalism by reconceptualizing laïcité and speaking openly about the issue
of Muslim integration actually served to reinforce the social divisions he sought to eliminate.
Sarkozy’s engagement with Muslims during his term as Minister of the Interior, notably through
his creation of the CFCM, reflected an overarching fear that disaffected, socially excluded
Muslims in France would become more radical in their religious views if the government did not
do something to prevent this communalism. Government actions regarding Muslim integration in
French society were thus grounded in a desire to stabilize Islam in France by placing the
government in a privileged position to define a new, French-style Islam in collaboration with
religious practitioners. By portraying Muslims as the antithesis of “Frenchness,” needing to be
modified in order to become French, Sarkozy advanced a nationalistic and antagonistic laïcité
founded on exclusion that in fact turned French Muslims away because they felt that
organizations such as the CFCM did not represent their reality. The laïcité positive approach did
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not mark a significant departure from Chirac’s interpretation of laïcité, as Sarkozy claimed, but
merely activated the term in a way that appeared to advocate inclusion. It did so only on a
surface level. This chapter shows yet another example of how laïcité has taken on different
meanings at different points in history as a function of sociopolitical circumstances and the
personal agendas of those invoking it. Laïcité proves itself yet again to be constantly evolving to
suit the needs of French politicians, capable of filling so many roles precisely because there has
never been a national discussion that stepped back to nail down what it means.

87
Conclusion

This thesis has investigated the function and uses of laïcité in modern France as the
nation finds itself with a substantial Muslim population after of several decades of significant
immigration flow from former colonies. Focusing on the era of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas
Sarkozy, I have uncovered the ways that both figures mobilized laïcité in order to advance their
respective agendas, both of which bore the marks of racist and Islamophobic thinking but were
couched in the language of Republicanism. Both presidents demonstrated a desire to make
Muslims assimilate to French culture that greatly outweighed any efforts to dismantle prejudice
towards Muslims and Arabs, or to adapt laïcité in a way that truly honors multiculturalism.
These two leaders’ adherence to a historical myth of laïcité prevented critical reexamination of
laïcité’s import and operative function in a new social and political context.
Furthermore, insistence that laïcité is an immutable principle failed to reflect its
instability from its beginnings in the French Revolution to the modern day. Laïcité was evoked
and hinted at for over a century before a law officially separated Church and State, and another
fifty years went by after that before the term was added to any government documents. To this
day, laïcité lacks any legal or official definition, yet political discourse treats it as so obvious and
quintessentially French that its meaning is understood without being spelled out. However, my
thesis shows how the lack of definitional specificity has allowed the term to take on various
inflections and incarnations throughout history. There are far too many examples to point them
all out, but by focusing on the specific issue of Muslim integration, my thesis has drawn attention
to a few of the most glaring contradictions in the way laïcité has been employed both historically
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and in modern times. To name just one of many possible examples, Sarkozy distinguished
himself from Chirac’s hardline interpretation of laïcité through his new laïcité positive approach
that framed laïcité as a protector of individual liberties that treats all religions equally insofar as
they conform to the rules set forth by laïcité, i.e. remaining in the private sphere. However,
Sarkozy repeatedly and publicly recalled the centrality of Christian values and heritage to French
national identity, thus showing how laïcité positive aimed to address the “Muslim problem”
while Christianity remained exempt from certain protocol. In this way, laïcité’s adaptability
continues to serve conflicting political ends. In the era of Chirac and Sarkozy, laïcité functioned
to encourage assimilation and suppress multiculturalism.
In failing to adapt the ideology of laïcité and Republicanism in the face of significant
demographic change, these two administrations effectively contributed to the forming of a
combative laïcité that intensified the emphasis on the public-private divide as a means of barring
signs of Muslim religiosity from French consciousness. On the surface, this process aimed to
integrate Muslims by making them abstract individuals capable of full participation in civic life
by adopting a laïque French identity and leaving their other identities behind. Underneath,
however, Republican politicians aimed to remove all non-French aspects of Muslim and Arab
citizens to render them the same as all other French citizens, removing “foreign” differences that
threatened social unity and stability. In this context, politicians revealed that while
Republicanism as an ideal is supposed to apply to all people, it applies only to those who are
already imbued with a certain Republican understanding of “Frenchness.”
Republicanism’s “abstract citizen” can thus be used as code for secular French Christian.
In order to integrate into French society, the Republican integration model requires “immigrants”
to adopt Western modes of being in a way that, at least to some degree, puts individuals at odds
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with other parts of their identities. The flaws of this integration model are well-demonstrated by
the extensive discourse on the veil. Long before the 2004 law outlawed the wearing of the
foulard in schools, such symbols were met with Republican distaste for their allusions to an
individual’s religious participation. To defenders of laïcité, the headscarf was an object of
proselytism and a communalistic pronouncement. While the 2004 law was passed on the grounds
of ensuring the neutrality of schools and public functionaries, the definition of neutrality was
highly subjective, mobilized in an attempt to specifically exclude manifestations of Muslim
religiosity. In this instance, the concept of neutrality was used to advance the acceptability of
Christianity, which allows for the compartmentalization of religion into the private sphere,
thereby pitting Islam in conflict with both modernity and Western values through the very visible
affirmation of faith that is the veil. The passing of the 2004 law was an insistence on the
incompatibility of Islam with French Western values and manifested as an attempt to regulate
and control Muslims. Ironically, this law functioned to radicalize the distinction between public
and private by forcing Muslim women to retreat into the private realm and out of public spaces if
they wished to express their religious identity freely and enjoy true freedom of conscience.237 In
this way, the 2004 law became a sponsor of the communalism it so feared and sought to
eradicate. In this new context, Muslim women found themselves in a social position that severely
limited their ability to participate in civic life without removing their veils and suppressing a
piece of their identity.
Just as the period treated in this thesis demonstrates how women were the most common
targets of Republican criticisms on the basis of laïcité, the politics of laïcité continue to
disproportionally affect women in increasingly severe ways. In 2010, the French Senate and
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National Assembly almost unanimously passed a law banning face-covering Islamic veils, or
burqas, in all public spaces, not just the school, as the 2004 veil law targeted. Just as there were
in reality only a small number of Muslim girls wearing veils in public schools (yet a law was
created to specifically target them), there were even fewer French women wearing burqas, with
estimates at about two thousand women. 238 Punishments for violating the law could include fines
and citizenship lessons, demonstrating how Islam continues to be framed as a religion in direct
conflict with Republican values that even hinders one’s ability to become a full citizen or to
understand what that citizenship represents.239
A few years later in the summer of 2016, controversy arose in the French Riviera
regarding the wearing of the burkini, a swimming garment that complies with Islamic modesty
standards.240 During this summer, several French towns implemented bans on the burkini due in
part to increased fears of Islamic terrorism following recent attacks. These bans rather
outrageously insisted that women wear less if they wished to enjoy public beaches. While these
bans were eventually overruled by France’s highest court, the Conseil d’État (State Council), for
their violation of civil liberties such as religious freedom, it is extremely telling that desire to
control Muslim women’s bodies ever went this far.241 The burkini bans demonstrate the way that
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laïcité is becoming increasingly combative—linking burkinis to terrorism!—and is mobilized in
a way that stigmatizes Muslim women and works to exclude them from public spaces.
Turning to even more recent events, an amendment to the 2004 law was proposed in July
2019 that would extend the veil ban to parents accompanying children on school field trips. 242
The proposed amendment drew widespread public attention in October when Julien Odoul, a farright politician from the Rassemblement National party (National Rally, formerly the Front
National), publicly humiliated a veiled mother accompanying schoolchildren on a field trip to
attend a regional assembly meeting by requesting that she remove her veil in the name of
laïcité.243 President Macron firmly opposed this bill, and the dominance of his center-left La
République en Marche! party in the National Assembly ultimately barred the adoption of this
amendment, but the controversy marks yet another example of France’s continued affront of
Muslim women on the grounds of laïcité. In this age of burqa bans, attempts to give the Republic
control over women’s attire, and efforts to expand the scope of the 2004 law, France is at a
crossroads. Now more than ever, the nation must consider the impact that combative laïcité has
on Muslim women and construct a new laïcité that represents the true spirit of vivre ensemble by
accepting the multicultural reality.
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